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Preface 
A safety hazard analysis was completed providing a preliminary safety assessment for the proposed 
L-band communication system. The assessment was performed following the guidelines outlined in the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions 
document (Ref. 1). It was delivered to NASA on December 19, 2009, under the fiscal year 2009 project-
level agreement. 
The safety analysis did not identify any hazards with an unacceptable risk, though a number of 
hazards with a medium risk were documented.  
This effort represents a preliminary safety hazard analysis. Section 3.6 details recommended triggers 
for risk reassessment. A detailed safety hazards analyses should be performed as a follow-on activity to 
assess particular components of the L-band communication system after the technology is chosen and 
system rollout timing is determined. 
The security risk analysis resulted in identifying main security threats to the proposed system as well 
as noting additional threats recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in the 
system development process. The document discusses various security controls, including those 
suggested in the COCR Version 2.0 (Ref. 2).  
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1.0 Introduction 
During the past 4 years, NASA Glenn Research Center and ITT have conducted a three-phase 
technology assessment for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the joint FAA-
EUROCONTROL cooperative research Action Plan (AP–17), also known as the Future Communications 
Study (FCS). NASA and ITT provided a system engineering evaluation of candidate technologies for the 
future communications infrastructure (FCI) to be used in air traffic management (ATM). Specific 
recommendations for data communications technologies in very high frequency (VHF), C-, L-, and 
satellite bands, and a set of follow-on research and implementation actions have been endorsed by the 
FAA, EUROCONTROL, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In the United States, 
the recommendations from AP–17 are reflected in the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) Integrated Work Plan (Ref. 3) and are represented in the National Airspace System (NAS) 
Enterprise Architecture Communications and Avionics Roadmaps. 
Action Plan 30 (AP–30), a follow-on cooperative research to AP–17, is expected to start in fiscal year 
(FY) 2010 to ensure coordinated development of the FCI to help enable the advanced ATM concepts of 
operation envisioned for both NextGen in the United States and for EUROCONTROL’s Single European 
Systems ATM Research (SESAR) program in Europe. Follow-on research and technology development 
recommended by NASA Glenn and endorsed by the FAA was included in the FAA’s NextGen 
Implementation Plan 2009. The plan was officially released at http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/ 
nextgen/on January 30, 2009. The implementation plan includes an FY09 Solution Set Work Plan for 
C-band and L-band future communications research under the section, “New Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) Requirements.” 
On 27 February 2009, the FAA approved a project-level agreement (PLA) (PLA FY09_G1M.02-
02v1) for “New ATM Requirements—Future Communications,” to perform the FY09 portion of that 
solution set work plan that includes development of concepts of use, requirements, and architecture for 
both a new C-band airport surface wireless communications system and a new L-band terrestrial en-route 
communications system.  
As required under the PLA, this document presents the preliminary safety and security risk 
assessment for L-band communications systems. The assessment draws on the functional system analysis 
conducted earlier and documented in the Concepts of Use (CONUSE), System Performance 
Requirements, and Architecture deliverable for Subtask 7–2A/B (Ref. 4).  
In addition to potentially providing an alternative link technology suitable to support the FAA’s Data 
Communications (Data Comm) Segment 3 requirements, including full four-dimensional trajectory-based 
operations, the L-band terrestrial en-route communications system is also envisioned to be able to support 
other future communications applications including mobile System Wide Information Management 
(SWIM) and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) safety-critical data communications, UAS command and 
control, and monitoring of UAS onboard sense-and-avoid and automation capabilities.  
Safety hazards identification, analysis, and assessment are performed assuming the services identified 
as potential applications for the L-band system (Ref. 5). Recommendations for safety risk mitigation 
techniques follow the analysis.  
This document also presents a security risk analysis following FAA security policy and appropriate 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards and includes security categorization, 
risks analysis, and controls.  
Both safety hazards and security threat analyses rely on FAA guidance documents, such as the NAS 
System Engineering Manual (Ref. 6), the Safety Management System Manual (SMS) (Ref. 7), and the 
System Safety Handbook (SSH) (Ref. 8) for methodology and process.  
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1.1 Document Overview 
This document is organized as follows: 
• Section 1.0 includes background system development information as well as document 
organization and references.  
• Section 2.0 describes the scope of the document. 
• Section 2.0 describes methodology and presents the results of safety risk analysis.  
• Section 3.0 discusses the issues related to information security and outlines results of the analysis. 
• Appendix A presents a list of acronyms used in the report. 
• Appendix B presents hierarchical diagrams of functional requirements for the proposed L-band 
communications system. 
• Appendix C contains L-band communications system safety hazards analysis worksheets showing 
the supporting work detail. 
• Appendix D presents a summary of the operational safety assessment for the ATS identified for 
L-band application adopted from the analysis presented in the Communications Operating 
Concept and Requirements (COCR) (Ref. 2). 
• Appendix E lists the existing NAS communications system safety controls. 
• Appendix F provides SP 800–53 security controls applicable to the L-band digital aeronautical 
communication system (L–DACS).   
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2.0 Scope 
2.1 Risk Management Objective 
The goal of risk management is to ensure that new system development and integration meet or exceed 
FAA safety standards that support the FAA’s core mission of ensuring the safety of the flying public. The 
objective of this document is to identify risks in the proposed L-band communication system from both 
safety and security viewpoints.  
Figure 1 shows how risk management fits into the overall FAA NAS system engineering process.  
 
 
Figure 1.—Risk in system engineering (Ref. 6). 
 
Although risk management is depicted as a separate system engineering task, as with most processes, 
it is closely intertwined with the other key elements. For example, as shown in this report, functional 
requirements resulting from the functional analysis process become the basis for the safety hazard and 
security threat analyses. Furthermore, the safety engineering (a discipline within specialty engineering) 
and risk management processes are both applied to perform a safety assessment for the system and the 
FAA information security methodology (defined within specialty engineering) is correlated with the FAA 
risk management model (Ref. 6). 
Within the opportunity-risk paradigm, the fundamental objective of the risk management process is to 
identify and analyze uncertainties of achieving program or organizational objectives and develop plans to 
reduce the likelihood and/or consequences of those uncertainties. 
This process is applied to ensure that a program or organization meets technical, schedule, and cost 
commitments, delivers a product or service that satisfies all stakeholders’ lifecycle needs, and provides 
the expected benefit. Four lower-level objectives are established as part of the overall objective: 
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• Timely identification of risks (identifying a potential problem with sufficient lead time so that the 
team may implement appropriate alternate plans) 
• Consistent assessment of the level of risk across a program (providing a structured decision 
making framework for prioritizing resource application) 
• Communication of risk mitigation actions across the program or organization (ensuring that all 
elements of the program or organization are aligned in resolving risks)  
• Review of risk mitigation action performance 
 
Positive impacts on a plan or favorable consequences are not considered in this document in 
accordance with the FAA risk identification and analysis process guidance that treats them as 
opportunities (Ref. 6). Rather “in the context of the SMS, safety is defined as freedom from unacceptable 
risk” (Ref. 7). 
2.2 Types of Identified Risks  
Various types of risks may be identified during the course of system development. As illustrated by 
Figure 2, high-level risks can be categorized as technical, schedule, and business or cost-related. 
 
 
Figure 2.—Types of potential risks. 
 
As explained in the NAS System Engineering Manual (SEM) (Ref. 6): 
Many sources must be considered for each risk area. For technical risk, likely sources 
include technology maturity, complexity, dependency, stakeholder uncertainty, 
requirements uncertainty, and testing/verification failure. Sources of schedule risks may 
include incomplete identification of tasks, time-based schedule (as opposed to event-
based schedule), critical-path scheduling anomalies, competitive optimism, unrealistic 
requirements, and material availability shortfalls. Cost risks may stem from an uncertain 
number of production units, supplier optimism, additional complexity, change in 
economic conditions, competitive environment, supplier viability, and lack of applicable 
historical data. 
Although the three types of risks are interrelated, this document will focus on technical risks only. 
Schedule and business risks are considered to be out of scope for this task and would significantly depend 
on system acquisition plan and schedule. 
Only safety and security risks will be addressed for this assessment. Also out of scope for this 
analysis are the hazards attributable to a controller, pilot, or automation, Occupational Safety and Health 
Technical Risks
Schedule 
Risks
Business 
Risks
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Administration (OSHA) hazards, and all hazards not directly related to ground-to-air and air-to-air 
communications, such as navigation systems and surveillance systems.  
It should be noted, however, that the specifics of the L-band system development and dependency on 
the partnership with the Europeans through Action Plan 30 will affect the schedule and contribute to 
program risks. Because of recent schedule revisions in European L-band system technology research, 
development, and prototyping, tasks that include and/or depend on choosing a specific L-band technology 
or finalizing the requirements, have been postponed. Consequently, because of potential change in 
technology and operational assumptions, activities completed under Task 7–2, including this document, 
will need to be revisited when L-band technology decisions have been finalized. This document presents a 
preliminary risk assessment and mitigation. 
At this time, two technologies, L–DACS–1 and L–DACS–2, are being considered for L-band system 
implementation (Ref. 9).  
The first option represents the state of the art in commercial developments employing 
modern modulation techniques and may lead to utilization/adaptation of COTS products 
and standards. The second capitalizes on experience from aviation specific systems and 
standards such as the VHF digital link (VDL) 3, VDL 4, and UAT. 
Final selection of the L-band data link technology will determine if any commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) products are used. The risk assessment should be revisited and hazards associated with the uses 
of COTS should be evaluated at that time as appropriate. COTS-based risk considerations identified in the 
SEM  (Ref. 6) should be used as a starting point for the assessment. 
2.3 System Safety Engineering and Information Security Engineering 
Two disciplines of specialty engineering (SE), system safety engineering (SSE) and information 
security engineering (ISE), are applied to conduct the analyses described by this document.  
It should be noted that another SE discipline, electromagnetic environmental effects (E3), is related to 
safety risk assessment but is better addressed with other interference issues. The risks of interference 
problems should be detailed and investigated, and should involve (Ref. 6) 
…system analysis for susceptibility and/or vulnerability to electromagnetic fields or 
capability to generate such fields that might interfere with other systems, identify sources 
of interference, and implement methods for correction within the levels prescribed by 
law, program requirements, spectrum management, or recognized standards. E3 consists 
of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) and Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). 
The results [should then be] used to derive, validate, and verify requirements; evaluate 
system design progress and technical soundness; and manage risk. 
SE analyses performed under this task are intended to aid in identifying and assessing potential 
operational problems early in the process and help shape system requirements. The results are fed into the 
risk management process for risk mitigation and control.  
For the purposes of this analysis, safety and security risk identification, assessment, and mitigation 
are addressed separately. However, similarities between the two types of the analysis are underlined 
throughout the document. Both are based on functional analysis of the L-band system, and both follow 
suggested FAA methodology for risk analysis. Furthermore, “From a safety perspective, the threats that 
concern security are another potential cause of safety hazards, while from a security perspective; the 
hazards that concern safety are another potential outcome of security threats,” (Ref. 10). Thus, hazard 
severity levels can be assigned to the safety hazards that could be caused by security threats. 
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3.0 Safety Risks Management 
3.1 Safety Analysis Requirement 
The need for a safety analysis is driven by the FAA categorization of changes requiring safety 
analysis. 
Table 1 depicts system changes that need to be evaluated for safety risk (Ref. 7) and identifies the 
changes applicable to the proposed introduction of an L-band system. As noted, only technical aspects of 
safety risk analysis are covered by this document. 
 
 
TABLE 1.—CHANGES REQUIRING SAFETY ANALYSIS 
Categories of change Changes applicable to 
L-band system? 
Airspace changes that impact safety Reorganization of air traffic route structure No 
Resectorization of an airspace No 
Changes to air traffic procedures and 
standards that impact safety 
Reduced separation minima applied to airspace No 
New operating procedures, including departure, 
arrival, and approach procedures 
Yes 
Waivers to existing procedures, requirements, or 
standards   
No 
Changes to airport procedures and standards 
that impact safety 
Reduced separation minima applied at an airport No 
Physical changes to airport runways, taxiways, or 
the airport operations area 
No 
Changes to equipment that impact safety Introduction of new equipment, systems (hardware 
and software) that impact safety, human-to-system 
interfaces, or facilities used in providing air traffic 
control (ATC) and navigation services 
Yes 
Modifications to systems (hardware and software), 
maintenance activities associated with those 
systems, human-to-system interfaces, or facilities 
used in providing ATC and navigation services 
 
3.2 Process 
The analyses described in this document adhere to the SSE methodology and involve (Ref. 6) 
Evaluation and management of the safety risk associated with a system using measures 
of safety risk identified in various hazard analyses, fault tree analyses, and safety risk 
assessments and in hazard tracking and control.  
It is anticipated that the approach adopted in this task will allow incorporation of suitable safety 
features in the system design with minimal cost and schedule impact. 
Figure 3 shows the inputs to the safety risk management (SRM) process performed for this task, 
noting the documents used for guidance. 
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Figure 3.—Safety risk management—inputs to the process (Acronyms defined in Appendix A). 
 
As depicted on Figure 4, the systematic SRM process applied for this task proceeded through five 
general phases (Ref. 7). 
 
 
Figure 4.—Safety risk management process. 
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Using the NAS SEM for guidance, the decision flow chart detailing how the process was 
implemented is shown in Figure 5. 
The following sections of this report describe the results of the activities conducted to implement this 
process. 
 
Figure 5.—Safety risk management decision flow chart (Ref. 7). 
3.3 System Description 
Accurate system description is the first step in a safety hazards analysis. As described in deliverable 
7–2A under Task 7, L-band System Engineering Concepts of Use and Systems Performance 
Requirements (Ref. 4), the system covered by this document will provide air-to-ground communications 
services in support of ATM, and resides within the dashed red box shown in Figure 6, which depicts an 
end-to-end communications system supporting air traffic services (ATS). On the ground, these systems 
typically consist of radio ground station subsystems, including radios, antennas, cabling, power systems, 
environmental systems, towers, and monitoring and control (M&C) functionality, to provide air-to-
ground communications services; networking subsystems to provide ground-to-ground communications 
service connectivity to end systems and users; and usually some centralized M&C functionality to 
monitor and control system operations and performance. 
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Figure 6.—Communications systems covered by this document (slightly altered Figure 1-1 from Ref. 11)  
 
Although this document supports the development of FAA ground-based systems, the scope of the 
proposed L-band communications system covers systems providing both ground-to-air and air-to-air 
communications services. Air-to-air communications is depicted in Figure 6 by showing two aircraft 
system elements.  
It should be noted that while Figure 6 effectively illustrates different types of communications 
provided by the proposed L-band system—air-to-air and air-to-ground—it depicts air traffic service 
provider (ATSP) systems only3.  
The L-band communications system safety hazard analysis as based on an L-band system functional 
analysis. This analysis is detailed in the L-band System Engineering—Concepts of Use, Systems 
Performance Requirements, and Architecture document (Ref. 4). Appendix B of this document contains 
hierarchical diagrams of the functional requirements for the proposed L-band system. The functional 
breakdown and methodology are adopted from the NAS Communication System Safety Hazard Analysis 
and Security Threat Analysis (Ref. 10) and modified as appropriate to reflect the scope and requirements 
for the proposed L-band system. 
At a high level, the following communication system functions were identified: 
 
• Use the communication system to send/receive messages 
– transceive fixed-to-mobile message 
– transceive mobile-to-fixed message 
– transceive mobile-to-mobile message 
• Provide the L-band communication system, including 
– monitor the L-band communication system 
– maintain the L-band communication system 
– configure the L-band communication system  
                                                     
3 ATSP presents a subset of a broader air navigation service providers (ANSP) category that in addition to ATSP 
may encompass aeronautical information services (AIS) providers, communication, navigation, and surveillance 
(CNS) providers), meteorological (office)/services (METS) providers, and includes airport/aerodrome flight 
information service (AFIS) providers. 
Aircraft System ElementOperator System 
Air Traffic Service Provider (ATSP) System 
Controller 
Air Traffic Service Unit (ATSU)
Flight Crew
Ground – Ground 
Communication 
Communication 
Services
Air – Ground 
Communication 
Procedures
(Flight Deck)
Procedures 
(ATSU) 
Human-
Machine 
Interfac
Interface to
Communication
Services 
End System
(ATSU)
Aircraft System Element
End System
(Aircraft)
Human-
Machine 
Interfac
Interface to 
Communication 
Services 
Air – Air 
Communication 
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Because of regulation constraints governing the aeronautical mobile (route) services spectrum over 
which the proposed L-band system is intended to operate, fixed-point-to-fixed-point (i.e., nonmobile) 
communication was determined to be out of scope of the L-band communications system and is not 
covered by Task 7–2 documents, including this document.  
Though the proposed L–DACS could enable ATS, AOC, and aeronautical administrative 
communication (AAC), ATS are likely to have the strictest safety and security requirements. As such, this 
document considers ATS being the worst case scenario from the safety view point.  
3.4 Safety Risk Identification 
Figure 7 shows the risk management risk identification process recommended by the FAA.  
 
 
Figure 7.—Federal Aviation Administration risk management risk identification flow chart (Ref. 6). 
 
Although, as identified in Figure 7, multiple factors contribute to the overall program and system 
risks, the scope of this document is limited to safety and security issues. Security risks are addressed later 
in this document. 
To identify safety hazards for the proposed L-band system, the hazards present in the current NAS 
Communications System were reviewed first. The safety hazards identified in the NAS Safety Hazard 
Analysis (Ref. 10) were found to be applicable to the proposed L-band system, and the Table 2 shows the 
safety hazard categories. Table 2 is decomposed into lower level hazards. 
 
  
•Operability  
•Productivity 
•Supportability 
•Human 
•Security 
•Safety  
•Performance 
•Acquisition 
Requirements
Cost TechnicalSchedule 
Risks
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TABLE 2.—SAFETY HAZARDS CATEGORIES 
Safety hazards categories Safety hazards
Hazards due to lack of availability of the 
L-band communication system 
L-band communication capability totally unavailable: L-band air traffic 
services (ATS) failure.
L-band communication capability partially unavailable: L-band ATS failure.
L-band system communication capability unavailable: sender to recipient of L-
band ATS unavailable.
Hazards due to failures of the L-band 
communication system 
L-band communication fails (e.g., aborts) with a given recipient for a single 
message.
L-band communication fails (e.g., aborts) with multiple recipients for a single 
message per aircraft.
Hazards due to misdelivery of a message by 
the L-band communication system 
The recipient accepts a message affecting separation from an L-band ATS that 
is not its control authority. 
The recipient accepts a message NOT affecting separation from an L-band 
ATS that is its control authority. 
A message affecting separation gets to unintended recipient.  
A message NOT affecting separation gets to unintended recipient. 
Hazards due to late delivery of a message by 
the L-band communication system 
Message affecting separation received too late (or expired).  
Message NOT affecting separation received too late (or expired). 
Hazards due to corruption of message by the 
L-band communication system 
A message affecting separation corrupted. 
A message NOT affecting separation corrupted. 
Hazards due to messages arriving out-of-
sequence due to the L-band communication 
system 
A message affecting separation sent/received out of sequence.  
A message NOT affecting separation sent/received out of sequence. 
 
These 15 hazard categories were then applied to each of the high-level L-band communication system 
functions shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.—Functional hazard categories. Acronyms are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Following the methodology suggested in the National Airspace System Communications System 
Safety Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis document (Ref. 10), fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-
fixed messages transmission functions were combined into one category, ATS to aircraft, for safety 
hazards analysis. Mobile-to-mobile transmissions hazards are shown in the aircraft-to-aircraft messages 
hazards category. 
•(1) ATS to Airborne Aircraft Message
•(2) ATS to On-Ground Aircraft Message
Transceive Fixed to 
Mobile Message
•(3) Airborne Aircraft to ATS Message
•(4) On-Ground Aircraft to ATS Message
Transceive Mobile 
to Fixed Message
•(5) Airborne Aircraft to Airborne 
Aircraft Message
Transceive Mobile 
to Mobile Message
ATS to Aircraft Category 
Aircraft to Aircraft Category 
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Based on this functional categorization of 15 hazard categories applied to each of the two functional 
categories, 30 L-band communication system safety hazards were identified. Details of the identified 
hazards and the safety causes of each hazard are presented in Appendix C.  
3.5 Safety Risks Analysis and Assesment 
Once again, it is useful to borrow from the NAS SEM (Ref. 6) to define the term risk: 
A risk has three aspects: (1) the event is in the future, (2) the likelihood/probability that 
an event will occur (a degree of uncertainty), and (3) a negative or unfavorable 
consequence/impact if it occurs. 
Safety risk analysis is the third step in the SRM process. For each of the identified L-band 
communication system safety hazards (summarized in Table 2 and detailed in Appendix C) the following 
process was followed (Ref. 10): 
The severity of consequence (i.e., what is the worst thing that can credibly happen) was 
determined. This was done by determining a system state for each hazard that could lead 
to the worst credible effect occurring and then tracing a scenario(s) that could result 
should the hazard occur.  
Table 3 summarizes the criteria used to classify severity of each hazard. Worksheets in Appendix C 
present the severity of the worst credible effect (WCE) for each of the hazards identified during the 
analysis.  
The system state leading to the WCE is the same for all hazards due to the L-band communication 
system: 
 
• Heavy traffic conditions 
• Instrument meteorological conditions (IMCs) 
• Adverse weather conditions 
 
Causes of identified hazards include 
 
• Hardware failure 
• Software failure 
• Insufficient capacity 
• RF interference 
3.5.1 Hazard Severity Definition and Safety Likelihood Categories 
Table 3 outlines hazard effects and the standardized classification scheme used to describe the severity 
of safety hazards as presented in the COCR Version 2.0 document (Ref. 2). It, in turn, is based on the 
FAA’s SMS manual severity and likelihood definitions and EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulatory 
Requirement (ESARR 4) Set 1 Severity Indicators.  
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TABLE 3.—DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD SEVERITY (REF. 2) 
Effect on Hazard class 
5, No safety 
effect (NO) 
4, Minor (MN) 3, Major (MJ) 2, Hazardous (HZ) 1, Catastrophic 
(CS) 
General  Does not 
significantly reduce 
system safety.  
Require actions are 
within operation’s 
capabilities. 
Includes: 
Reduces the 
capability of the 
system or operators 
to cope with adverse 
operating conditions 
to the extent that: 
Reduces the 
capability of the 
system or 
operators to cope 
with adverse 
operating 
conditions to the 
extent that: 
Total loss of 
system control 
such that: 
Air traffic 
control (ATC) 
Slight increase in 
ATC workload 
Slight reduction in 
ATC capability, or 
significant increase 
in ATC workload 
Reduction in 
separation as defined 
by a low/moderate 
severity operational 
error, or significant 
reduction in ATC 
capability 
Reduction in 
separation as 
defined by a high-
severity 
operational error, 
or a total loss of 
ATC 
Collisions with 
other aircraft, 
obstacles, or 
terrain 
Flying public No effect on 
flightcrew 
Has no safety 
effect 
Inconvenience 
Slight increase in 
workload 
Slight reduction in 
safety margin or 
functional 
capabilities 
Minor illness or 
damage 
Some physical 
discomfort 
Significant increase 
in flightcrew 
workload 
Significant reduction 
in safety margin or 
functional capability. 
Major illness, injury, 
or damage 
Physical distress 
Large reduction in 
safety margin or 
functional 
capability 
Serious or fatal 
injury to small 
number 
Physical distress 
or excessive 
workload 
Outcome would 
result in: 
 
Hull loss 
Multiple fatalities 
 
Following the methodology described in the NAS Communication System Hazard Analysis and Security 
Threat Analysis (Ref. 10) as well as in the COCR Version 2.0 (Ref. 2), this safety analysis was limited to 
hazards caused by L-band communication system failures; hazards due to the controller and the flight crew, 
outside of the communication link portion of a system and/or service, were considered out of scope.  
Definitions of safety likelihood categories qualifying and quantifying the degree of tolerance for each 
category are shown in Table 4. The likelihood of occurrence of the WCE for each of the identified 
hazards is presented in the hazard analysis worksheets in Appendix C. 
 
TABLE 4.—SAFETY LIKELIHOOD CATEGORIESa 
Category Qualitativeb,c Quantitatived 
A Frequent Expected to occur frequently for an item  Probability of occurrence per operation/operational hour 
≥1×10–3 
B Probable Expected to occur several times in the 
life of an item  
Probability of occurrence per operation/operational hour 
<1×10–3, but ≥1×10–5 
C Remote Expected to occur sometime in the 
lifecycle of an item 
Probability of occurrence per operation/operational hour 
<1×10–5 but ≥1×10–7 
D Extremely remote Unlikely but possible to occur in an 
item’s lifecycle 
Probability of occurrence per operation/operational hour 
<1×10–7 but ≥1×10–9 
E Extremely 
improbable 
So unlikely, it can be assumed that it will 
not occur in an item’s lifecycle 
Probability of occurrence per operation/operational hour 
<1×10–9 
aAdopted from Ref. 1. Only part of the table found relevant to this analysis is presented. 
bQualitative definition for individual item/system as defined in Ref. 1 is used. The definition excludes ATC service/NAS level 
system (assumes NAS-wide occurrence is an order of magnitude greater than an individual item/system), flight procedures, and 
operational definitions.  
cThese qualitative definitions differ from the definitions used in the existing NAS System Safety Risk Analysis. 
dAssumes 24 hr/day each day of the year or approximately 8000 hr/yr for a single item or system.
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Hazard severity and safety likelihood definitions used in this document are the same and/or similar to 
those used in the NAS Communication System Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis (Ref. 10) 
for the existing system as well as the COCR Version 2.0 (Ref. 2) as applied to individual services 
(described later in this document). They, in turn, are based on the recommendations provided in Safety 
Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions document (Ref. 1).15  
3.5.2 L-band System Safety Risks Matrix 
Finally, risk was determined for each L-band communication system hazard using its severity and 
likelihood values. A summary of the risk associated with each of the 30 hazards identified for the L-band 
communication system is shown in Table 5 and detailed in the hazard worksheets in Appendix C. Figure 
9 and Figure 10 present the findings in the “stop-light” matrix format. 
Safety risk likelihood and severity were determined by mapping the results of the operational safety 
assessments for the ATS documented in COCR to the L-band system safety hazards. A summary of the 
safety assessment for the subset of services applicable to the L-band system is presented in Appendix D. 
It should be noted that for the assessment, when more than one category of services is potentially affected 
by a safety hazard, the most severe hazard assessment is applied.  
The COCR identifies two phases of implementation of operational service capabilities. The first 
phase is based on existing or emerging data communications services and is scheduled to be completed 
around 2020. Initial steps under this phase are currently being implemented, for example, as part of the 
Data Comm Program. During the second phase, data communications is expected to become the primary 
means of air-ground communication supporting increased automation in the aircraft and on the ground.  
The L-band system is proposed to be introduced during the second phase of the FRS implementation. 
As such, only the Phase II COCR data is adopted for Table 5. 
The L-band system should support air to ground as well as air-to-air communications. 
Implementation of air-to-air communications would be considered to follow an air-to ground 
communications implementation.  
Data communications is a primary objective for the proposed system; digital voice may be considered 
in the future set of capabilities.  
 
TABLE 5.—L-BAND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY RISK SUMMARY 
Safety hazards Safety risk likelihood and severitya
Air traffic services 
(ATS) to aircraft 
Aircraft to aircraft
Exist. 
NAS 
L-band 
FCS 
Exist. 
NASb 
L-band 
FCS 
1. Communication capability totally unavailable: ATS failurec 3D 3D 4E 2D
2. Communication capability partially unavailable: ATS failure 3D 3Cd 4E 2D
3. System communication capability unavailable: sender to recipient of ATS 
unavailable 
4D 4C 4D 2D
4. Communication fails (e.g., aborts) with a given recipient for a single 
message 
4C 4Be 5 2Df
5. Communication fails (e.g., aborts) with multiple recipients for a single 
message per aircraft 
4C 3Cg N/Ah 2D
6. The recipient accepts a message affecting separation from an ATS system 
that is not its control authority. 
2D 2D N/Ah N/A
7. The recipient accepts a message NOT affecting separation from an ATS 
system that is its control authority. 
5 5D N/Ah N/Af
                                                     
15It should be noted that the letters used to categorize likelihood definitions and the numbers suggested for the 
severity of consequences definitions in NAS SEM are used opposite to the ones used herein (i.e., “A” represents a 
nonlikely event, and “E” is for Nearly Certain; 1stands for low risk hazards, and while 5 is for High). This 
discrepancy does not affect the methodology or the essence of risk analysis.  
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TABLE 5.—L-BAND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY RISK SUMMARY 
Safety hazards Safety risk likelihood and severitya
Air traffic services 
(ATS) to aircraft 
Aircraft to aircraft
Exist. 
NAS 
L-band 
FCS 
Exist. 
NASb 
L-band 
FCS 
8. A message affecting separation gets to unintended recipient. 2D 2D NCi 2D
9. A message NOT affecting separation gets to unintended recipient. 5 5D 5 N/Af
10. Message affecting separation received too late (or expired). 2D 2D N/Ah 2D
11. Message NOT affecting separation received too late (or expired). 5 5D N/Ah N/Af
12. A message affecting separation corrupted. 2D 3D4 2E 2D
13. A message NOT affecting separation corrupted. 5 5D 5 N/Af
14. A message affecting separation sent/received out of sequence. 4D 3Dj N/Ah 2D
15. A message NOT affecting separation sent/received out of sequence. 5 5D N/Ah N/Af
aRisk likelihood and severity vary depending on stage of flight (i.e., an aircraft on final approach/terminal airspace would 
typically have a reduced separation vs. en route potentially increasing the risk and severity in terminal airspace). Severity 
assessment presented in this document is based on a worst case scenario.
bIn existing NAS system analysis aircraft-to-aircraft hazards are considered second-level failures and apply only when ATS-
aircraft communications has failed. 
cWhere hazard was split in two cases, the most significant risk is shown.
dThe system being partially unavailable is considered to be more likely than it being totally unavailable. The severity for the 
partial and total unavailability is assumed the same as a worst case scenario.
eClassified as probable (B) and minor severity (4) because of the capability of retransmissions.
fAt this time, only separation-related service has been defined as air-to-air communications on L-band. 
gConsidered less likely but potentially more severe than failure of communication with a given recipient. 
hNo NAS messages have been identified. 
iNo credible scenario having safety effect was envisioned.
jAssumed to be not as severe as when a message affecting separation received too late or expired because system would 
recognize corruption and request retransmission, assuming that retransmission comes within latency requirements. If 
retransmission is too late, then Hazard 10 would apply.
 
 
Figure 9.—L-band system safety risk matrix air-traffic-services-to-aircraft communication. 
Severity
No Safety 
Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Likelihood 5 4 3 2 1
Frequent A
Probable B
1
Remote C
1 2
Extremely 
Remote D
5 3 3
Extremely 
Improbable E 4
*
* Unacceptable with Single Point
and Common Cause Failure
High Risk
Medium Risk
Low Risk
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Figure 10.—L-band system safety risk matrix aircraft-to-aircraft communication. 
 
 
Figure 11.—Risk acceptance criteria (Ref. 1). 
 
The completed risk assessment shows that none of the hazards associated with the proposed L-band 
communication system were determined to be high risk.  
3.5.3 Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)-Related Services Safety Risks  
Services related to (UAS) operations are also considered candidates for the L-band system 
applications. Data transmission is expected to be used as a primary mode of communication with voice 
Severity
No Safety 
Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Likelihood 5 4 3 2 1
Frequent A
Probable B
Remote C
Extremely 
Remote D
9
Extremely 
Improbable E 4
*
* Unacceptable with Single Point
and Common Cause Failure
High Risk
Medium Risk
Low Risk
High risk – Unacceptable risk, proposal cannot be implemented
unless hazards are further mitigated so that risk is reduced to
medium or low level and AOV approves the mitigating controls.
Medium risk – Acceptable risk - minimum acceptable safety
objective; proposal may be implemented, but tracking and
management are required.
Low risk – Target - acceptable without restriction or limitation;
hazards are not required to be actively managed but are
documented.
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communications limited to special advisories and emergencies or for aircraft not equipped for datalink 
exchanges (Ref. 12).  Studies considering the implications of operating a UAS in nonsegregated airspace 
are underway, and RTCA SC–203 is currently creating the standards for the community. The COCR has 
not assessed the requirements to support command and control links (i.e., telecommand and telemetry) for 
the UAS.  
As UAS requirements mature, the command and control link traffic load could be estimated. As noted 
in COCR (Ref. 2),  
All other communications services with UASs are considered to be the same as those 
with manned aircraft, i.e., UAS operation is transparent for the ATM system. In the 
future, in some parts of the world, the number of these vehicles may represent a large 
portion of an Air Traffic Service Unit’s (ATSU’s) traffic load. When providing ATS to a 
UAS, this may involve the relay of communication and execution instructions to and 
from a remote pilot; however, operational performance requirements between an ATSU 
and an UAS remain the same as those between an ATSU and any manned aircraft.  
A UAS safety analysis will greatly depend on user applications that may vary from commercial to 
government, military to civil, etc.  As defined by the ITU19 and illustrated in Figure 12, commercial 
applications would provide services that would be sold by contractors in the course of carrying out normal 
business operations, while Governmental applications ensure public safety by addressing different 
emergencies and involve issues of public interest and include scientific matters. 
 
 
Figure 12.—Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) applications (from proposed changes to Ref. 13). 
 
Example operational scenarios for each type of application are presented in Table 6 demonstrating a 
wide range of possible applications. 
  
                                                     
19 Proposed changes to Ref. 13. 
NASA/CR—2011-216327 18  
 
TABLE 6.—UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEM OPERATIONAL SCENARIOSa,b 
Mission 
Type 
Scenario Description 
 
Movie making, sports games, and popular events like concerts 
 
Cargo planes with reduced manning (one-man-cockpit) 
 
Inspections for industries (e.g., oil fields, oil platforms, oil pipelines, power line, or rail line) 
 
Provision of airborne relays for cell phones in the future 
 
 
Commercial agricultural services like crop dusting 
 
 
Earth science and geographic missions (e.g., mapping and surveying or aerial photography) 
Biological, environmental missions (e.g., animal monitoring, crop spraying, volcano monitoring, biomass 
surveys, livestock monitoring, or tree fertilization) 
 
Coastline inspection, preventive border surveillance, drug control, anti-terrorism operations, strike events, search-
and-rescue of people in distress. Public interest missions like remote weather monitoring, avalanche prediction 
and control, hurricane monitoring, forest fires prevention surveillance, insurance claims during disasters, and 
traffic surveillance. 
 
Famine relief, medical support, aid delivery, search-and-rescue activities 
 
aProposed changes to Ref. 13. 
bAdditional scenarios and detail can be found  in Ref. 12. 
 
As stated at the International Conference & Exhibition on Unmanned Aircraft Systems that took place 
in Paris, France in June 2009, the RTCA Special Committee 203 (SC–203) and EUROCAE Working 
Group 73 (WG–73) have agreed to collaborate on a pilot project for initial UAS safety assessments.  
3.5.4 Airborne System Wide Information Management (SWIM) Suitable Services Safety 
Assessment 
System Wide Information Management (SWIM), an FAA technology program designed to facilitate 
sharing of ATM system information (airport operational status, weather information, flight data, status of 
special use airspace, and NAS restrictions), might be implemented via ground-to-ground, air-to-ground, 
and air-to-air communications infrastructure components. Each of these components would enable 
efficient data exchange between authorized users in the respective domain. An L–DACS could provide 
means for the air-to-air and air-to-ground data transfer. 
An implementation of the proposed L-band system would facilitate meeting the primary objective of 
the SWIM program, that is, to improve the FAA’s ability to manage the efficient flow of information 
through the NAS. When used to enable airborne SWIM capabilities, an L-band system could be designed 
to assure that its use provides the following desired SWIM features: 
 
• Reduced costs for NAS users to acquire NAS data and exchange information 
• Increased shared situational awareness among the NAS user community 
• FAA-compliant secure data exchange among the NAS user community 
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Figure 13 shows how airborne SWIM (with the communication links potentially provided over the 
L-band) fits in the overall FAA air-to-ground communications plan and illustrates interactions of SWIM 
elements with the other NextGen programs, such as ADS–B and Data Comm.  
 
 
Figure 13.—Airborne SWIM and other NextGen programs (Ref. 14). Acronyms are defined in Appendix A. 
 
As shown in Figure 13, L–DACS communications links will have a lower safety targets when used to 
provide SWIM-related services compared with the other data communications services. For example, 
Figure 13 shows a required level of C3 (medium risk) for Data Comm and D/E 4/5 9 (low risk) for 
SWIM. 
3.6 L-band Communication System Safety Risks Treatment 
The final step in the safety analysis is to treat the risk. Risk treatment includes mitigation, monitoring, 
and tracking. Risk monitoring and tracking are sometimes referred to as risk maintenance. 
3.6.1 Risk Mitigation 
Figure 14 illustrates the risk management strategies that were considered (Ref. 7).  
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Figure 14.—Risk strategy options. 
 
Risk avoidance is typically an operational strategy that involves a “go” or “no-go” decision. This 
analysis focuses on technical risks only. Although operational controls could be applied to mitigate 
technical risks, for example, a decision not to have a particular service provided over the L-band, such a 
measure is likely to apply to high- risk hazards only. Since none of the hazards were found to be high risk, 
the risk avoidance strategy is not recommended for mitigation of the L-band safety risks.  
Also, risk transfer does not appear applicable to the presented communications system analysis. The 
risk transfer strategy shifts the ownership of risk to another party. Again, such operational change could 
be used to mitigate a technical risk; for example, transfer of aircraft separation responsibility in applying 
visual separation from the air traffic controller to the pilot would likely to apply to high-hazard risks only. 
Because none of the hazards were found to be high risk, the risk transfer strategy is not recommended for 
mitigation of the L-band safety risks.  
Risk assumption and risk control have been determined to be the strategies most applicable to the 
mitigation of the identified technical risks. Following FAA recommendations (Ref. 7), risk assumption 
should be limited to lower level risks, as it implies assuming a risk, a likelihood of occurrence, and its 
consequence (i.e., a safety risk must be reduced to medium or low before it can be accepted into the 
NAS).  
As noted in Reference 10, multiple existing controls are present in the NAS system that 
either prevent or reduce the probability of the hazard occurring at all, or should the 
hazard occur, prevent or reduce the likelihood of the worst credible severity effect from 
occurring. Existing controls can be requirements, equipage, procedures, and/or 
environmental conditions. Many of the existing controls are not specific to the NAS 
Communication System itself (e.g., the requirement to protect the airspace of both the 
current and amended clearance is a control of the NAS system as a whole). Existing 
controls were implemented specifically with safety in mind.  
The existing controls identified by the NAS safety analysis are included in Appendix E. Most of the 
existing controls are expected to remain in place at the time of L-band system implementation. Many of 
the controls can also be viewed as requirements (generally identified by “the system shall…”) and as such 
are included among functional or performance requirements in the L-band System Engineering, 
CONUSE, System Performance Requirements, and Architecture document (Ref. 4). 
Table 18 is annotated with the existing controls that would not be relevant to the proposed system. 
Additional controls specific to L–DACS might be added as part of system design and 
implementation. For example, the current trend points toward meeting QoS and reliability requirements 
with the number of communications threads needed to satisfy these requirements. Depending on final 
Feasible risk strategy options identified 
by the risk management activity: 
Risk avoidance: 
select a 
different 
approach or do 
not participate 
in the 
operation, 
procedure, or 
system 
development
Risk transfer: 
shift the 
ownership of 
the risk to 
another party
Risk 
assumption: 
accept the 
likelihood, 
probability, 
and 
consequences 
associated with 
the risk
Risk control: 
develop 
options and 
alternatives 
and/or take 
actions to 
minimize or 
eliminate the 
risk
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services selection (i.e., essential vs. critical), if requirements cannot be met otherwise, the second link or 
backup system will be considered. If a system is implemented in segments, as a Data Comm program, a 
backup system may be added at a later stage if and when critical services requiring higher reliability are 
added. 
3.6.2 Safety Risks Maintenance 
Risks are dynamic; their profile would change depending on events, decisions, and actions on the 
project. Therefore, risk monitoring and tracking are integral parts of any risk management process. It is 
especially important for a new state of the art system such as the proposed L-band communications 
system.  
As noted earlier, this document presents a preliminary safety risk assessment. Safety hazards, their 
consequences, and probability of occurrence need to be reevaluated as the L-band system development 
progresses. Triggers for risks reassessment should include 
CONUSE changes or significant modifications.—The safety risks assessment detailed in this 
document was based on the identified concepts of use. User requirements changes, modifications to 
system scope, services addition, and so on, will all affect the safety risks.  
Modification or deletion of any of the existing controls.—Existing NAS controls were assumed to 
be in place at the time of L-band system implementation. Should they be deleted or modified, safety risks 
should be reassessed.  
Technology development.—As technology is not finalized at the time of this study, safety risks 
identification was limited to high-level, technology-independent risks. Additional risks may be identified 
as technology selection progresses. The risks may involve but not limited to interference to and from 
incumbent systems, capacity limitations, COTS use, and so on.  
Schedule milestones.—Various risks exist in respect to the L-band system development and 
implementation schedule in the United States and Europe. This document is limited to technical risks 
identification. Because of schedule changes and coordination requirements between the United States and 
European partners, schedule issues are intertwined with the technology development risks noted above. 
Schedule milestones should be used as triggers for safety risks reassessment. The milestones would 
include building an L-band communications system prototype, completion of interference testing, 
preparation of design documents, and final technology selection.  
Additionally, the maturity and implementation schedule of other components of the FCS will affect 
L-band system development. For example, it is assumed throughout this document, as well as all the other 
Task 7 studies, that the FAA Data Comm system will be in place by the time an L-band system is 
introduced. As a more definitive timeline and technology details become available, potential interfaces 
between the proposed L-band system and C-band and VDL-2 Data Comm systems will be developed. 
Safety risks analyses will need to be reviewed, updated, and amended as appropriate. Risk tracking will 
become most relevant at the start of system implementation. 
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4.0 Information Security Engineering and Security Risk Management 
4.1 Information Security Engineering Objective and Scope 
Information security engineering (ISE) involves evaluation of the system vulnerability to 
unauthorized access and use or susceptibility to sabotage. It also involves assessment of the ability of the 
system to survive a security threat in the expected operational environment (Ref. 6).  
As noted in the COCR Version 2.0 (Ref. 2),  the goals of information security include 
 
• Safety (mitigating attacks that contribute to safety hazards) 
• Flight security (mitigating attacks that contribute to delays, diversions, or cancelations of flight) 
• Protection of business interests (mitigating attacks that result in financial gloss, reputation 
damage, or disclosure of sensitive information) 
 
The proposed L-band system will be designed in accordance with the FAA security policy31 that 
states that 
 
The FAA shall ensure that security is provided commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting 
from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of information for all agency information collected, 
processed, transmitted, stored, or disseminated in FAA information systems and in information systems used on 
behalf of the FAA. The FAA shall also ensure that systems and applications used by or for the FAA provide 
appropriate confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability. 
 
For the purposes of this analysis, confidentiality, integrity, and availability are defined as follows:  
 
Confidentiality.—Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, processes, or 
devices.  
Integrity.—Assurance that an information system is operating without unauthorized modification, 
alteration, impairment, or destruction of any of its components.  
Availability.—Assurance that information and communications services will be ready for use when 
expected.  
 
It should be noted that in the context of a security threat assessment, integrity and availability provide 
assurance in the face of deliberate attacks as opposed to accidental errors typically addressed during 
safety risk analysis. 
4.2 Information Security Engineering and Security Risk Management Process 
Safety and security risk analyses are interrelated and should be addressed as such. For example, 
denying service to an aircraft that is unable to authenticate its identity and thus does not meet the security 
requirements may reduce safety.  
As noted in both the COCR Version 2.0 (Ref. 2) in respect to the security analysis for a FRS as well 
as the security threat analysis of the existing NAS communications system (Ref. 10), information security 
is evolutionary, because the capabilities and motivations of attackers change over time. The evolutionary 
nature of information system security means that it is important to follow a defined process during 
security threat analyses of systems so that the motivation for requirements is well understood, and the 
analyses can be revisited and revised as attacks change.  
Figure 15 shows a correlation between the risk management and closed-loop security risk 
management processes. 
 
                                                     
31 From Ref. 15, please note, this version of the document has been superseded. 
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Figure 15.—Correlation of information security methodology with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) risk 
management model (Ref. 6). Acronyms are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Following the guidance provided in the NAS SEM, this document attempts to apply similar processes 
and methodologies to both safety and security analyses.  
Figure 16 illustrates the correlation between the security threat analysis and safety hazards analysis 
methodologies (Ref. 10).  
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Figure 16.—Correlation between security threat analysis and safety hazard analysis. 
 
The security threat analysis process adheres to the overall risk management model and is tailored to 
closely follow the safety threat analysis. The methodology is adopted from the NAS Communications 
System Safety Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis document (Ref. 10).  
The same functional analysis is used as a common starting point for both disciplines. Understanding 
functional requirements and physical architecture aids in identifying the information types handled by the 
proposed system. 
Security categorization provides an initial assessment of the intrinsic sensitivity of the information 
being handled by the communications system in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  
Next, risks are identified determining system vulnerabilities and threats. The high-level threats to the 
system are examined, focusing on areas that are the likely concerns based on the security categorization, 
and then the severity and likelihood of the threats are assessed.  
Finally, the security requirements and recommendations are developed to address the threats. The 
proposed security requirements are coordinated with safety requirements to ensure they do not result in 
new safety hazards and vice versa.  
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Both security categorization and risk analysis use impact and severity rankings: none, low, medium, 
high-severe, and high-catastrophic. These categories roughly correspond to the standard safety hazard 
classes no safety effect, minor, major, hazardous, and catastrophic, respectively, although as noted above, 
security considers financial impact and impact on public perception in addition to safety-related impact. 
The detailed definitions for the categories are provided in Table 7. 
 
 
TABLE 7.—SECURITY SEVERITY CATEGORIES (REF. 10) 
Severity 
category/hazard 
class 
Safety Availability Cost Passenger 
privacy 
Exposure of 
proprietary 
information 
Public 
perception 
None/5 General: no or negligible safety 
impact. 
Air traffic control (ATC): slight 
increase in ATC workload. 
Flying public: inconvenience 
No impact No 
financial 
loss 
No impact No impact No impact 
Low/4 General: limited safety impact; 
includes self-repairing and 
limited damage or disruption to 
system functions.  
ATC: degradation in mission 
capability to an extent and 
duration that the communication 
system is able to perform its 
primary functions, but the 
effectiveness of the functions is 
noticeably reduced; or 
significant increase in ATC 
workload.  
Flying public: slight increase in 
flight crew workload, or slight 
reduction in safety margin or 
functional capabilities, or minor 
illness or damage, or some 
physical discomfort.  
Recoverable 
loss of 
redundancy 
or backup 
capability 
Minor 
financial 
loss, or 
minor 
damage to 
assets 
Exposure 
of limited 
private 
information 
of small 
number of 
people 
Disclosure of 
nonsensitive 
airline 
operation 
information 
 Distrust of 
some 
passengers 
in aircraft 
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TABLE 7.—SECURITY SEVERITY CATEGORIES (REF. 10) 
Severity 
category/hazard 
class 
Safety Availability Cost Passenger 
privacy 
Exposure of 
proprietary 
information 
Public 
perception 
Medium/3 General: serious safety impact. 
Example: system failure, 
damage or disruption that 
impairs the safe control of air 
traffic over time and/or requires 
local restoration of systems 
capabilities.  
ATC: significant degradation in 
mission capability to an extent 
and duration that the 
communication system is able to 
perform its primary functions, 
but the effectiveness of the 
functions is significantly 
reduced; or reduction in 
separation as defined by a 
low/moderate severity 
operational error, or significant 
reduction in ATC capability; or 
significant damage to 
communication system assets.  
Flying public: significant 
increase in flight crew 
workload, or significant 
reduction in safety margin or 
functional capability, major 
illness, injury, damage, or 
physical distress.  
Significant 
flight delays 
Significant 
financial 
loss or 
Significant 
damage to 
assets 
Exposure 
of private 
information 
of small 
number of 
people 
Disclosure of 
some 
sensitive 
airline 
operation 
information 
 Strong 
distrust of 
some 
passengers 
in aircraft 
High-severe/2 General: severe safety impact. 
Example: system failure, 
damage or disruption that 
immediately affects the safe 
control of aircraft or destroys 
system assets beyond recovery 
capabilities.  
ATC: severe degradation in, or 
loss of, mission capability to an 
extent and duration that the 
Communication System is not 
able to perform one or more of 
its primary functions; or 
reduction in separation as 
defined by a high severity 
operational error, or a total loss 
of ATC.  
Flying public: large reduction in 
safety margin or functional 
capability, serious or fatal injury 
to small number, or physical 
distress/excessive workload.  
Flight 
interruptions 
Major 
financial 
loss or 
severe 
damage to 
assets 
Exposure 
of private 
information 
of large 
number of 
people 
Disclosure of 
lots of 
sensitive 
airline 
operation 
information, 
some 
security 
information 
 Strong 
distrust of 
many 
passengers 
in aircraft 
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TABLE 7.—SECURITY SEVERITY CATEGORIES (REF. 10) 
Severity 
category/hazard 
class 
Safety Availability Cost Passenger 
privacy 
Exposure of 
proprietary 
information 
Public 
perception 
High- 
catastrophic/1 
General: catastrophic safety 
impact, or total loss of systems 
control. 
ATC: collision with other 
aircraft, obstacles, or terrain. 
Flying public: hull loss, multiple 
fatalities. 
Fleet  
re-route 
Huge 
financial 
cost, or 
destruction 
of aircraft 
Exposure 
of private 
information 
of large 
number of 
people 
Disclosure of 
highly 
sensitive 
airline 
operation 
information, 
security 
information 
Complete 
distrust of 
many 
passengers 
in air traffic 
 
 
The definitions of categories in Table 7 were developed during the security threat analysis for the 
current NAS systems and were designed to maximize the commonality with established safety 
terminology. The definitions were derived from a number of sources: the FAA’s Information Systems 
Security Program Handbook (Ref. 15), the FAA’s SSMP handbook (Ref. 8), NIST Federal Information 
Processing Standards (FIPS) 199 (Ref. 16), NIST Special Publication (SP) 800–30 (Ref. 17), and the 
European Union’s Security of Aircraft in the Future European Environment (SAFEE) project (Ref. 18). 
  
Note: For the categories shown in Table 7, the “None” and “Low” map to FIPS 199 “Low;”the 
“Medium” category maps to FIPS 199 “Medium;”and the “High—Severe” and “High—Catastrophic” 
map to FIPS 199 High.  
 
To align the security and safety analyses, the likelihood ratings used in the safety analysis were 
applied here. These rankings are given in Table 4. However, only qualitative definitions of the safety 
likelihood rankings are used for the security analysis, because the presence of an attacker makes threat 
likelihood estimation considerably more difficult to quantify. 
The security risk assessment matrix similar to the one resulted from the safety analysis was created 
based on threat severity and threat likelihood to determine if a particular threat represents an unacceptable 
risk.  
In the matrix, a green cell indicates a likelihood-severity combination that represents an acceptable 
risk; a red cell indicates a likelihood-severity pair that shows an unacceptable risk requiring further 
mitigation; and a yellow cell indicates a likelihood-severity that represents a moderate risk, potentially 
requiring additional analysis to determine if mitigation is recommended. 
Once the risks are identified and analyzed, the process applies effective and suitable technical, 
procedural, physical, and administrative controls to mitigate these risks to an acceptable level. ISE 
methodology combines control measures for prevention, detection, and recovery from security attacks 
that would compromise confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of information technology assets 
(including information).  
4.3 Inputs to Information Security Engineering and Security Risk Management 
Figure 17 presents FAA security policy and guidance applied to the L-band system security risk 
management process. Some of the publications listed were quoted in the document; some were used 
indirectly as contributors to the studies and reports referenced throughout this document.  
NASA/CR—2011-216327 28  
 
Figure 17.—Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) security policy and guidance (slightly modified figure from Ref. 19). 
4.4 Security Threat Identification 
Risks to the proposed L-band system may arise from events such as, but not limited to, the following 
(Ref. 6): 
 
• Unauthorized (malicious or accidental) disclosure, modification, or destruction of information 
• Unintentional errors and omissions 
• IT disruptions due to natural or manmade disasters 
• Failure to exercise due care and diligence in the implementation and operation of the IT system 
 
The main threats to the proposed system are listed in Table 8. Existing NAS communications system 
security threats (Ref. 10) and threats identified in the COCR Version 2.0 (Ref. 2) were reviewed. As a 
result of the analysis and based on the discussions with the FAA and NASA, a methodology followed by 
the COCR was adopted (Ref. 20).  
The focus during threat identification is on communications threats, because these are the 
threats that are likely to be mitigated by the communications system itself and are likely to 
motivate FRS security requirements that will require standardization. As a result, threats like 
insider threats—which are important but which are unlikely to be mitigated by the 
communications system itself—and threats to the monitoring, maintenance, and control (MMC) 
of the FCI are not included in Table 8. 
 
TABLE 8.—L-BAND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM HIGH-LEVEL THREATS 
Threat Identifier Threat description
T.DENIAL System resources may become exhausted due to system error, nonmalicious user actions, or denial-of-service (DoS) attack.
T.DENIAL.FLOOD An attacker floods a communications segment of the L-band system with injected messages in order to reduce the availability of the L-band system.
T.DENIAL.INJECT An attacker injects malformed messages into a communications segment of the L-band system in order to reduce the availability of the L-band system.
T.DENIAL.INTERFERE An attacker injects deliberate radiofrequency (RF) interference into an RF communication segment of the future communications infrastructure (FCI) in order to reduce the availability 
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TABLE 8.—L-BAND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM HIGH-LEVEL THREATS 
Threat Identifier Threat description
of the L-band system.
T.ENTRY An individual other than an authorized user may gain access via technical or non-technical attack for malicious purposes.
T.ENTRY.ALTER 
An attacker delays, deletes, injects, modifies, redirects, reorders, replays, or otherwise alters 
messages on a communications segment of the L-band system in order to reduce the integrity 
of the L-band system.
T.ENTRY.EAVESDROP An attacker eavesdrops on messages on a communications segment of the L-band system in order to reduce the confidentiality of the L-band system.
T.ENTRY.IMPERSONATE An attacker impersonates a user of the L-band system in order to reduce the confidentiality or integrity of the L-band system, or simply to gain free use of the L-band system. 
 
It is recommended for a future security analysis conducted at a later stage in system development 
process and completed outside the scope of this subtask to include, but not be limited to, the following 
additional threats: 
 
• T.ACCESS (An authorized user may gain unauthorized access via technical or nontechnical 
attack for malicious or nonmalicious purposes.) 
• T.DEVELOP (Security failures may occur as the result of problems introduced during design, 
development, and implementation of the system.) 
• T.FAILURE (The secure state of the system could be compromised in the event of a system 
failure.) 
• T.INSTALL (The system may be delivered or installed in a manner that undermines security.) 
• T.MAINTAIN (The security of the system may be reduced or defeated due to errors or omissions 
in the administration and maintenance of the system.) 
• T.OBSERVE (Events occur in system operation that compromise security, but the system, due to 
flaws in its specification, design, or implementation, may lead a competent user or technician to 
believe that the system is still secure.) 
• T.OPERATE (Security failures may occur because of improper operation of the system.) 
• T.PHYSICAL (Security-critical parts of the system may be subjected to a physical attack that 
may compromise security.) 
4.5 Security Risks Analysis and Assesment 
The risk assessment matrix was created to analyze individual security risks. “The matrix reflects the 
level of risk associated with the likelihood of a given threat source exploiting a given vulnerability and 
the impact of that threat source successfully exploiting the vulnerability” (Ref. 6). To create the matrix, 
the service-level threat severity analysis and assessment were reviewed. Table 9 contains the information 
security service-level threat severity assessment for the services identified as potential applications for the 
L-band communications system. The table is a subset of information presented in COCR Version 2.0. The 
column headers are defined as follows (Ref. 2): 
 
• Service.—The acronym for the service name. 
• Confidentiality.—The relative operational impact of violation of confidentiality. 
• Integrity.—The relative operational impact of corruption of the integrity. 
• Availability.—The relative operational impact of the loss of use/provision of the service. 
 
The threat severity categories (e.g., high and medium) are defined in Table 7. 
 
NASA/CR—2011-216327 30  
TABLE 9.—INFORMATION SECURITY THREAT SEVERITY FOR 
L-BAND SYSTEM SERVICESa,b 
Service Confidentiality Integrity Availability 
D-ORIS None Medium Low 
D-OTIS None High-severe Medium 
D-SIG None Medium Low 
D-RVR None High-severe Low 
WAKE None High-severe High-severe 
FLIPCY Low High-severe Medium 
SAP Low Medium Low 
PPD Low Low Low 
D-SIGMET None High-severe Medium 
DYNAV Low High-severe Medium 
URCO None Medium Medium 
AIRSEP Low High-severe High-severe 
aA portion of Table 4-11 from Ref. 2. This table contains information relevant 
to L-band system security only. 
bAcronyms are defined in Appendix A. 
 
The COCR notes that the initial assessment of threat likelihood and threat severity assumes that the 
FCI contains no specific security controls or intrinsic security mitigations. While current L-band 
technology proposals do not include technologies with the inherent mitigation of deliberate RF 
interference as do certain spread spectrum radio systems, security features will vary depending on 
technology chosen. 
Table 10 contains likelihood and severity assessments for the each of the threats identified above. 
Threat likelihood is ranked based on its potential for realization and is determined based on its motivation 
and required capabilities. 
 
• Motivation.—A ranking of how strong the motivation is to realize the threat. A value in the range 
1 to 3 is assigned to motivation, with 3 representing strong motivation and 1 representing weak 
motivation. 
• Required capabilities.—A ranking of how much financial and technical capability is required to 
realize the threat. A value in the range 1 to 3 is assigned to required capabilities, with 3 
representing a low requirement, and 1 representing a high requirement.  
 
Threat likelihood values are determined by multiplying the motivation and required capabilities 
values (Ref. 2). 
A result of 1 corresponds to E, extremely improbable, 2 corresponds to D, extremely remote, 3 
corresponds to C, remote, 4 or 6 corresponds to B, probable, and 9 corresponds to A, frequent.49 
Threat severity is ranked based on the potential impact of the threat if it is realized, using the 
following categories: 
• None: There is no perceivable impact on safety, flight regularity, or business interests. 
• Low: There is a limited adverse effect on safety, flight regularity, or business interests. 
• Medium: There is a serious adverse effect on safety, flight regularity, or business interests. 
• High-severe: There is a severe adverse effect on safety, flight regularity, or business interests. 
• High-catastrophic: There is a catastrophic effect on safety, flight regularity, or business interests. 
 
                                                     
49 Note that COCR (Ref. 2) ranking is unlikely, 1 to 3, likely 4 to 6, and highly likely, 7 to 9. 
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To calculate severity, potential impacts on safety, flight regularity, and business needs are considered, and 
a value in the range 1 to 5 assigned to each, with 1 being the most serious impact and 5 being the least 
serious impact. Threat severity is then determined based on the maximum of the three values assigned, 
with a maximum value of 1 corresponding to high-catastrophic, 2 corresponding to high-severe, etc. 
(Ref. 2). 
 
TABLE 10.—THREAT LIKELIHOOD AND SEVERITY 
Threat identifier Likelihood Severityc 
Motivationa Required 
capabilitiesb 
Overall Safety Flight  
regularity 
Business 
needs 
Overalla 
T.DENIAL 
T.DENIAL.FLOOD 3 2 B 2 3 3 High severe
T.DENIAL.INJECT 3 2 B 2 3 3 High severe
T.DENIAL.INTERFERE 3 3 A 2 3 3 High severe
T.ENTRY 
T.ENTRY.ALTER 3 2 B 2d 4 3d High severe
T.ENTRY. 
EAVESDROP 
3 3 A 5 5 3e Medium 
T.ENTRY. 
IMPERSONATE 
3 2 B 2d 4 3d High severe
aMotivation: 1 = week; 3 = strong 
bRequired capabilities: 1 = high; 3 = low 
cSeverity: 1 = most serious; 5 = least serious 
dThe COCR notes a safety rating of 1 and business needs rating of 3 for this category. A less strict rating was found to 
be more applicable for the L-band based on the services selected as applications for the L-band. The most severe rating 
identified in the COCR for L-band service is high-severe. 
eThe COCR notes a business needs rating of 2 for this category. A less strict rating was found more applicable for the 
L-band based on the services selected as applications for the L-band. 
 
Figure 1851 shows the security risk assessment matrix created based on the results of the above 
analysis. 
                                                     
51 Note that the risk grid shown in the FAA SEM (Ref. 6) is slightly different being equivalent to categorizing 3B, 
2C, and 1D and E as medium risk. The presented matrix follows the format and methodology suggested by Ref. 1. 
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Figure 18.—Security risk assessment matrix. 
 
4.6 Security Risks Treatment 
As pointed out in NIST SP800–53 (Ref. 20): 
The selection and employment of appropriate security controls for an information system 
are important tasks that can have major implications on the operations and assets of an 
organization as well as the welfare of individuals. Security controls are the management, 
operational, and technical safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information 
system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its 
information. 
4.6.1 Summary of the Applicable COCR Version 2.0 Security Analysis 
Various controls were discussed in the COCR Version 2.0 in respect to FCS information security. 
The section of the COCR describing the security controls for FRS was found applicable and as such is 
presented below (Ref. 2).  
There are a wide variety of security controls or countermeasures and it is necessary to 
consider various architectural issues in order to determine which controls should be used 
to protect the FCI.  
Controls based on cryptography and encryption can be applied at a variety of protocol 
layers. One important question is which layer or layers of the FCI should include 
cryptographic protection. The answer to this question will clarify the extent to which 
controls impinge on the specification of the FRS. 
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In addition, procedural controls such as voice read-back and waveform controls such as 
frequency hopping can be used to mitigate certain threats. Redundancy can be built into 
the provision of any part of the FCI, through duplication of elements such as radios, and 
alternate network paths. A firewall can be placed at any network interconnection, and 
apply rules for packet filtering based on parameters such as originator and destination 
address. 
The properties of these controls are summarized in Table 11.  
 
TABLE 11.—PROPERTIES OF SECURITY CONTROLSa 
Procedural controls Involves Example Good for 
Human users  Voice read-back T.ENTRY.ALTER 
End-to-end  
cryptographic protection 
End systems  Aeronautical 
Telecommunications 
Network (ATN) Security, 
S/MIME, SSL/TLS 
T.ENTRY.ALTER 
T.ENTRY.EAVESDROP 
T.ENTRY.IMPERSONATE 
Network level 
cryptographic protection 
Boundary intermediate  
systems (BIS) 
IPSec T.ENTRY.ALTER 
T.ENTRY.EAVESDROP 
T.ENTRY.IMPERSONATE 
Link level  
cryptographic protection 
Radio, logical characteristics Wireless LAN, GSM security 
measures 
T.DENIAL.FLOOD 
T.DENIAL.INJECT 
T.ENTRY.ALTER 
T.ENTRY.EAVESDROP 
T.ENTRY.IMPERSONATE 
Waveform controls Radio, radiofrequency 
characteristics 
Spread spectrum T.DENIAL.FLOOD 
T.DENIAL.INTERFERE 
Redundancy Second radio system 
(same or different technology) 
VHF voice alternate radio site 
(ground), spare channels 
T.DENIAL.FLOOD 
T.DENIAL.INTERFERE 
Firewall Routers  COTS firewall products T.DENIAL.FLOOD 
T.DENIAL.INJECT 
aAcronyms are defined in Appendix A. 
 
The conclusions of the architectural discussion are (from Ref. 2): 
 
• Cryptographic protection appears to be the preferred approach to mitigate T.ENTRY.ALTER, 
T.ENTRY.EAVESDROP, and T.ENTRY.IMPERSONATE. 
• Cryptographic protection at the link layer, network layer, or application layer can be used to 
mitigate T.ENTRY.ALTER, and T.ENTRY.IMPERSONATE. There are trade-offs involved in 
deciding which protocol layer to protect. For example, application layer protection may be 
preferred from a security perspective since it secures the packet end-to-end. But link layer 
protection may be preferred from a cost perspective since a single secure channel can be used to 
protect a large number of services. 
• Cryptographic protection at the link layer, network layer, or application layer can also be used to 
mitigate T.ENTRY.EAVESDROP. However since only a small number of services require 
mitigation of T.ENTRY.EAVESDROP and encryption could affect the safety of ATS, it is 
expected that end-to end cryptographic protection will be used in this case. 
• One control that mitigates T.DENIAL.INJECT is link level cryptographic protection. This would 
impact the FRS specification. Use of a firewall to selectively filter received data is an alternative, 
which would not impact the FRS specification. 
• A system configuration, which involves radio set and channel redundancy may be a cost effective 
way to mitigate T.DENIAL.INTERFERE and T.DENIAL.FLOOD, since such redundancy is 
already expected to be required to address safety issues associated with equipment failure. 
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4.6.2 Further Analysis Based on NIST SP800–53 
The NIST SP800–53 (Ref. 20) document presents a security controls catalog listing management, 
operational, and technical security controls for low-, moderate-, and high-impact information systems.  
According to the classification suggested in Reference 20, and based on the COCR Version 2.0 
(Ref. 2) analysis of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for various services summarized in Table 9, 
the proposed L-band system security category is high-impact.  
Security controls documented in the catalog were reviewed; those found applicable to the proposed 
L-band system are included in the Appendix F. 
Common security controls account for the controls that “can be applied to one or more organizational 
information systems” (Ref. 20). Controls proposed for other data communications systems as well as the 
controls currently implemented in NAS should be examined as available.  
4.6.3 Continued Security Assessment 
Many of the security attacks against communications systems exploit threats not considered during 
system design and implementation. This document presents a preliminary security risk analysis only. The 
assessment will need to be regularly revisited and revised to ensure that it remains up-to-date with attack 
innovations and development decisions. As noted in NIST SP800–53 (Ref. 20),  
an effective information security program should include periodic assessments of risk, 
including the magnitude of harm that could result from the unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and information 
systems that support the operations and assets of the organization. 
Additionally, the analysis presented here was conducted as a high-level analysis and was not intended 
to replace a more detailed security risk analysis required at a later stage in system development process.  
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Appendix A.—Acronyms and Abbreviations 
The following list identifies acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this document. 
 
AAC aeronautical administrative communication 
ADS automatic dependent surveillance  
ADS-B automatic dependent surveillance—broadcast 
ADS-C automatic dependent surveillance—contract 
ADS-R automatic dependent surveillance—rebroadcast 
AFIS  airport/aerodrome flight information service 
AIM aeronautical information management 
AIRSEP  air-to-air self separation  
AM(R)S aeronautical mobile (route) service 
ANSP air navigation service provider 
AOA autonomous operations area 
AOC aeronautical (airline) operational control 
AP–17 Action Plan 17 
AP–30 Action Plan 30 
APT airport 
ARNS Aeronautical Radio Navigation Services 
ARTCC air route traffic control center 
ATC air traffic control 
ATCO air traffic control officer (controller) 
ATCRBS air traffic control radar beacon system  
ATCSCC air traffic control system command center 
ATCT air traffic control tower(s) 
ATN Aeronautical Telecommunications Network 
ATM air traffic management 
ATS air traffic services 
ATSP air traffic service provider 
ATSU air traffic service unit 
AVS advisory services  
CDM collaborative decision making 
CNS communication, navigation, surveillance 
COCR Communications Operating Concepts and Requirements 
CONOPS concepts of operations 
CONUSE concepts of use 
COTS commercial off-the-shelf 
CPFSK continuous phase frequency shift keying  
DoD Department of Defense 
D–ORIS data link operational route information service 
D–OTIS data link operational terminal information service 
D–RVR data link runway visual range  
D–SIG data link surface information and guidance 
D–SIGMET data link significant meteorological information  
D–TAXI data link taxi clearance 
DYNAV dynamic route availability 
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E3 electromagnetic environmental effects 
EIS emergency information services 
ER en route 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FCI Future Communications Infrastructure 
FCS Future Communications Study 
FDD frequency division duplex 
FIS flight information services 
FLIPCY flight plan consistency 
FRS Future Radio System 
GSM Global System for Mobile Communications 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc 
IFR instrument flight rules 
IOC initial operating capability 
ISE information security engineering  
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
IWP integrated work plan 
JPDO Joint Planning and Development Office 
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
L–DACS L-band Digital Aeronautical Communications System 
LDL L-band digital link 
LOS Line-of-sight 
M&C monitoring and control 
MAC medium access control 
MTBF mean time between failures  
NAS National Airspace System 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System 
NEXRAD Next-Generation Weather Radar 
NNEW NextGen Network Enabled Weather 
NOCC National Operations Control Center  
NOTAM Notices to Airmen  
OFDM orthogonal frequency division multiplexing 
OI operational improvement 
OPA operational performance assessment 
ORP oceanic, remote, polar 
OSED operational services and environment description 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PIREP pilot report 
PLA project-level agreement 
PPD pilot preferences downlink 
QoS quality of service 
RAC risk analysis code 
RAM requirements allocation matrix 
RF radiofrequency 
RFI radiofrequency interference 
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RNAV area navigation 
RNP required navigation performance  
RNSS radio navigation satellite system 
RTCA RTCA, Inc. (founded as Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics) 
RVR runway visual range  
SAMS Special Use Airspace Management System 
SAP system access parameters 
SBS surveillance and broadcast services 
SE system engineering  
SEM System Engineering Manual 
SESAR Single European Sky ATM Research 
SHA Safety Hazard Analysis 
SMS Safety Management System 
SRM safety risk management   
SSE system safety engineering  
SSH System Safety Handbook 
SSR secondary surveillance radar 
STARS Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 
SUA special use airspace 
Surv surveillance 
SWIM  System Wide Information Management 
SYSCO system supported coordination  
TACAN tactical air navigation 
TBO trajectory-based operations 
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
TFM traffic flow management 
TFR temporary flight restrictions 
TIS–B traffic information services, broadcast  
TMA terminal maneuvering area 
TVS terminal voice switch  
UA unmanned aircraft 
UAS unmanned aircraft system 
URCO urgent contact 
VDL VHF digital link 
VHF very high frequency 
WAKE wake vortex 
WCE worst credible effect 
WRC World Radio Communications Conference 
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Appendix B.—Hierarchical Diagrams of Functional Requirements 
Appendix B contains the functional analysis of the L-band communication system presented as a 
series of hierarchical diagrams. Details are discussed in Reference 4. The functional analysis was used to 
structure both the safety and security analyses. The “L” preceding all of the numerical functional levels is 
used to represent L-band.  
The analysis and diagrams are adopted from the National Airspace System Communications System 
Safety Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis document (Ref. 10).  
Solid blocks in the diagrams represent system functions that are part of the L-band system scope 
assumptions; white background blocks show NAS functions that are currently not part of the L-band 
functionality.  
 
 
Figure 19.—L-band communications system high level. 
 
 
Figure 20.—Decomposition of use L-band communications system (transmit/receive messages). 
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Figure 21.—Decomposition of transceive fixed-to-mobile message. 
 
 
Figure 22.—Decomposition of transceive mobile-to-fixed message. 
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Figure 23.—Decomposition of transceive airborne-mobile-to-airborne-mobile messages. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24.—Generic decomposition of transceive data message. 
 
 
 
Figure 25.—Generic decomposition of initiate data message. 
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Figure 26.—Generic decomposition of process data message for sending. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27.—Generic decomposition of send data message. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28.—Generic decomposition of process received data message. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29.—Generic decomposition of deliver data message. 
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Figure 30.—Generic decomposition of provide failure processing. 
 
List of failure detection subfunctions: 
 
• Authentication failures 
• Function unavailability 
• Message unintelligible or garbles 
• Message inaudible 
• Message or message components missing or faulty 
• Invalid or incorrect message components 
• Checksum failures 
• Invalid recipient 
 
 
 
Figure 31.—Decomposition of operate L-band communications system.  
 
 
 
Figure 32.—Decomposition of monitor L-band communications system.  
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Figure 33.—Decomposition of configure L-band communications system.  
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Figure 34.—Decomposition of maintain L-band communications system.  
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Appendix C.—Safety Hazard Analysis Worksheets 
C.1 L-band Communication Safety Hazard Analysis (SHA) Table Cross Reference 
For each of the five L-band communication system functions resulted from the functional system 
analysis and shown in Appendix A, a typical list of the types of messages transmitted is shown in Table 
12. For some functions, the hazard scenarios were considered to be the same; and thus a single hazard 
worksheet table can be used for more than one function. The last column of Table 12 provides a cross 
reference to the function’s hazard worksheet table. 
 
TABLE 12.— SAFETY HAZARD ANALYSIS TABLE CROSS REFERENCEa,b 
 Information type 
(including 
corresponding 
function ID) 
Message examples Hazard table 
cross 
reference 
1 Transceive ATS  
to airborne 
aircraft message 
L.1.1.1.1 
• Contract requesting data 
• Contract acknowledgements 
• OTIS reports, addressed or broadcast communications 
• ORIS reports, addressed or broadcast communications 
• SIGMET reports, addressed or broadcast communications, event basis 
only 
• Airport data to be displayed on board (D–SIG) 
• RVR information, addressed or broadcast communications 
• Available alternative routes (DYNAV), addressed communication 
• Urgent contact message (URCO), addressed and/or broadcast 
communications 
Table 13 
Transceive airborne 
aircraft to ATS 
message 
L.1.1.2.1 
• Requests (i.e., demand, periodic, or event contract) for reports 
• Contract acknowledgements 
• Current and periodic position (FLIPCY), addressed communications 
• Meteorological data (FLIPCY), addressed communications 
• Ground speed (FLIPCY), addressed communications 
• Indicated heading, indicated air speed or match, vertical rate, selected 
level, and wind vector (SAP), addressed communications 
• Broadcast of WAKE characteristics (e.g., aircraft type, weight, and 
flap and speed settings) 
• Flight Limitations (e.g., maximum acceptable flight level) (PPD), 
addressed communications 
• Pilot flight preferences (PPD), addressed communications 
• Flight plan modification requests (e.g., desired route or speed 
limitations) (PPD), addressed communications 
• Urgent contact message (URCO), addressed and/or broadcast 
communications 
Table 13 
2 Transceive ATS  
to on-ground 
aircraft message 
L.1.1.1.2 
• Contract requesting data 
• Contract acknowledgements 
• OTIS reports, addressed or broadcast communications 
• ORIS reports, addressed or broadcast communications 
• SIGMET reports, addressed or broadcast communications, event basis 
only 
• Airport data to be displayed on board (D-SIG) 
• RVR information, addressed or broadcast communications 
• Available alternative routes (DYNAV), addressed communication 
• Urgent contact message (URCO), addressed and/or broadcast 
communications 
Table 13 
Transceive on-
ground aircraft 
to ATS message 
• Requests (i.e., demand, periodic, or event contract) for reports 
• Contract acknowledgements 
• Current and periodic position (FLIPCY), addressed communications 
Table 13 
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TABLE 12.— SAFETY HAZARD ANALYSIS TABLE CROSS REFERENCEa,b 
 Information type 
(including 
corresponding 
function ID) 
Message examples Hazard table 
cross 
reference 
L.1.1.2.2 • Meteorological data (FLIPCY), addressed communications 
• Ground speed (FLIPCY), addressed communications 
• Indicated heading, indicated air speed or mach, vertical rate, selected 
level, and wind vector (SAP), addressed communications 
• Broadcast of WAKE characteristics (e.g., aircraft type, weight, and 
flap and speed settings) 
• Flight limitations (e.g., maximum acceptable flight level) (PPD), 
addressed communications 
• Pilot flight preferences (PPD), addressed communications 
• Flight plan modification requests (e.g., desired route or speed 
limitations) (PPD), addressed communications 
• Urgent contact message (URCO), addressed and/or broadcast 
communications 
3 Transceive airborne 
aircraft to 
airborne aircraft 
message 
L.1.1.3.1 
• Trajectory intent exchange (AIRSEP), addressed and/or broadcast 
communications 
• Conflict negotiation (AIRSEP), addressed and/or broadcast 
communications 
• Resolution accept/confirmation 
Table 14 
aMessage types are based on services definitions presented in Ref. 2. 
bAcronyms are defined in Appendix A. 
 
C.2 Hazard Analysis Worksheets 
For each of the hazards identified for the L-band communication system, the potential causes of the 
hazard were listed. The worksheets are slightly modified worksheets from the tables provided in 
Reference 10. The modifications include but are not limited to different risk and risk analysis code (RAC) 
assessments. The system state was also identified. The system state used is the state that fosters the worst 
credible outcome. The safety hazard analysis was captured in the tabular and table format.  
The columns shown in the safety hazard analysis tables are defined as follows: 
 
• Column 1—Hazard identification: unique tag used to identify each hazard 
• Column 2—Hazard Description: description of the hazard 
• Column 3—Causes: list of potential causes that could result the hazard occurring 
• Column 4—Risk analysis code: using the risk categorization outlined earlier in this report, the 
column provides the worst possible credible effect and the likelihood of that effect should the 
hazard occur 
• Column 5—Potential effects: provides a scenario leading to the worst credible effect if the hazard 
occurs 
• Column 6—Comments: provides additional rationale for the resulting risk/RAC 
C.2.1 L-band Air Traffic Services to Aircraft Hazards 
The section presents the 15 identified L-band communication system hazards as they apply to 
messages exchanged between an ATS and an aircraft. The aircraft may be either airborne or on the 
ground. Hazard 1 is split into 2 cases (1a and 1b) to distinguish between total and partial loss of ATS 
ground communication. Table 13 contains the hazard analysis worksheet for the following functions: 
 
• L.1.1.1.1 Transceive ATS to Airborne Aircraft Message 
• L.1.1.1.2 Transceive ATS to On-Ground Aircraft Message 
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• L.1.1.2.1 Transceive Airborne Aircraft to ATS Message 
• L.1.1.2.2 Transceive On-Ground Aircraft to ATS Message 
 
The system state leading to the worst credible effect (WCE) is the same for all ATS-aircraft hazards 
due to the L-band communication system: 
 
• Heavy traffic conditions 
• Instrument meteorological conditions (IMCs)  
• Adverse weather conditions 
 
Possible effects are unrelated to the services currently planned for an L–DACS; for example, the 
WCE would generally apply to using the data link for clearance-related services that may be provided 
over L–DACS. 
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3D
 
C
as
e 
1 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r n
ee
ds
 to
 is
su
e 
ne
w
 o
r a
m
en
de
d 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
 to
 se
ve
ra
l a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
W
he
n 
try
in
g 
to
 tr
an
sm
it 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
, c
on
tro
lle
r i
s i
nf
or
m
ed
 th
at
 m
es
sa
ge
s c
an
no
t b
e 
tra
ns
m
itt
ed
 (v
oi
ce
 n
or
 d
at
a 
av
ai
la
bl
e)
. 
O
R 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r k
no
w
s i
n 
ad
va
nc
e 
th
at
 N
A
S 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 is
 u
na
va
ila
bl
e.
  
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r t
ra
ns
fe
rs
 c
on
tro
l t
o 
an
ot
he
r s
ec
to
r. 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
on
tro
lle
r w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 a
ls
o 
ca
us
e 
a 
sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 a
irc
re
w
 w
or
kl
oa
d,
 b
ut
 so
m
e 
co
ul
d 
be
 ti
m
e-
cr
iti
ca
l d
ec
is
io
ns
. 
• 
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 a
ir 
tra
ff
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
ty
. 
O
R 
C
as
e 
2 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 a
tte
m
pt
s t
o 
se
nd
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 re
sp
on
se
 a
nd
 fi
nd
s o
ut
 h
e/
sh
e 
is
 u
na
bl
e 
to
 d
o 
so
. 
• 
B
ot
h 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
s a
re
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
. 
• 
W
or
kl
oa
d 
re
m
ai
ns
 w
ith
in
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d 
so
 n
o 
ha
za
rd
. 
O
R 
C
as
e 
3 
• 
A
irc
ra
ft 
di
ve
rts
 fr
om
 ro
ut
e 
an
d 
ai
rc
re
w
 a
tte
m
pt
s t
o 
se
nd
 m
es
sa
ge
 in
di
ca
tin
g 
di
ve
rs
io
n 
an
d 
fin
ds
 o
ut
 h
e 
or
 sh
e 
is
 u
na
bl
e 
to
 d
o 
so
. 
• 
A
irs
pa
ce
 is
 N
O
T 
pr
ot
ec
te
d 
an
d 
re
su
lts
 in
 p
ot
en
tia
l c
on
fli
ct
. 
• 
G
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 re
al
iz
es
 a
irc
ra
ft 
po
si
tio
n 
fr
om
 su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 o
ut
-o
f-
co
nf
or
m
an
ce
 a
le
rt,
 o
r c
on
fli
ct
 a
le
rt.
 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r c
an
no
t c
on
ta
ct
 a
irc
ra
ft 
an
d 
m
us
t t
ra
ns
fe
r c
on
tro
l t
o 
an
ot
he
r c
on
tro
l 
fa
ci
lit
y 
to
 m
ov
e 
th
e 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
in
 c
on
fli
ct
 w
ith
 th
e 
di
ve
rti
ng
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
on
tro
lle
r w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 a
ls
o 
ca
us
e 
a 
sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 a
irc
re
w
 w
or
kl
oa
d,
 b
ut
 so
m
e 
co
ul
d 
be
 ti
m
e-
cr
iti
ca
l d
ec
is
io
ns
. 
• 
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 a
ir 
tra
ff
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
ty
. 
A
irc
ra
ft 
m
ay
 o
r 
m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
aw
ar
e 
of
 g
ro
un
d 
fa
ilu
re
 (e
.g
., 
un
til
 a
irc
ra
ft 
at
te
m
pt
s a
 
tra
ns
m
is
si
on
 a
nd
 
it 
is
 n
ot
 
ac
kn
ow
le
dg
ed
). 
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ba
nd
 sy
st
em
 
co
m
m
un
ic
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io
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ca
pa
bi
lit
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av
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bl
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ft)
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irc
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w
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an
no
t 
se
nd
 o
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ec
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nd
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3.
 I
ns
uf
fic
ie
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 R
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in
te
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en
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A
irc
re
w
 n
ee
ds
 to
 re
qu
es
t n
ew
 o
r a
m
en
de
d 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e.
 
• 
W
he
n 
try
in
g 
to
 re
qu
es
t t
he
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
, a
irc
re
w
 d
et
er
m
in
es
 th
at
 m
es
sa
ge
 c
an
no
t 
be
 tr
an
sm
itt
ed
. 
O
R 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 k
no
w
s i
n 
ad
va
nc
e 
th
at
 N
A
S 
ai
rc
ra
ft-
gr
ou
nd
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
 a
re
 
un
av
ai
la
bl
e.
 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 m
us
t u
se
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
m
ea
ns
 o
f c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
(e
.g
., 
re
la
y)
. 
• 
Th
is
 m
ay
 c
au
se
 a
 sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 a
irc
re
w
 w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
• 
Th
is
 re
su
lts
 in
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
on
tro
lle
r w
or
kl
oa
d 
m
ov
in
g 
ot
he
r a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
Sl
ig
ht
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 a
ir 
tra
ff
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
ty
 d
ue
 to
 u
se
 o
f a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
pr
oc
ed
ur
es
. 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
on
e 
or
 a
ll 
ai
rc
ra
ft,
 b
ut
 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
be
tw
ee
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft.
 
A
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—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 4
 
M
es
sa
ge
 fa
ils
 w
ith
 a
 
gi
ve
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft.
 
1.
 G
ro
un
d 
m
es
sa
ge
 
(o
r p
ar
t) 
do
es
 n
ot
 
m
ak
e 
it 
to
 
ai
rc
ra
ft.
 
2.
 A
irc
ra
ft 
m
es
sa
ge
 
(o
r p
ar
t) 
do
es
 n
ot
 
m
ak
e 
it 
to
 
gr
ou
nd
. 
4B
 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r i
ss
ue
s a
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
. 
• 
C
on
tro
lle
r d
oe
s n
ot
 re
ce
iv
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 c
le
ar
an
ce
; e
ith
er
 th
e 
ai
rc
re
w
 d
id
 n
ot
 re
ce
iv
e 
th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
or
 th
e 
ai
rc
re
w
 re
ce
iv
ed
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 lo
st
. 
• 
Th
er
e 
is
 a
n 
am
bi
gu
ity
 o
f w
he
th
er
 th
e 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
is
 e
xe
cu
tin
g 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t o
r n
ew
 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e.
 H
ow
ev
er
; b
ot
h 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
s a
re
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
. 
• 
Th
is
 re
su
lts
 in
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
co
nt
ro
lle
r w
or
kl
oa
d 
in
 re
so
lv
in
g 
th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
(e
.g
., 
re
tra
ns
m
itt
in
g 
th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
) 
• 
Sl
ig
ht
 lo
ss
 o
f a
ir 
tra
ff
ic
 c
on
tro
l c
ap
ab
ili
ty
 in
 th
e 
af
fe
ct
ed
 a
re
a.
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m
ak
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 A
irc
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m
es
sa
ge
 
(o
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ar
t) 
do
es
 n
ot
 
m
ak
e 
it 
to
 
gr
ou
nd
. 
3C
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C
on
tro
lle
r i
ss
ue
s n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
s t
o 
m
ul
tip
le
 a
irc
ra
ft.
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C
on
tro
lle
r d
oe
s n
ot
 re
ce
iv
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
; e
ith
er
 th
e 
ai
rc
re
w
 d
id
 n
ot
 
re
ce
iv
e 
th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e,
 o
r t
he
 a
irc
re
w
 re
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iv
ed
 th
e 
cl
ea
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nc
e 
an
d 
re
sp
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se
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 lo
st
. 
• 
Th
er
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 a
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he
th
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rc
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ft 
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ut
in
g 
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e 
cu
rr
en
t o
r n
ew
 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
. H
ow
ev
er
, b
ot
h 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 n
ew
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le
ar
an
ce
s a
re
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
. 
• 
Th
is
 re
su
lts
 in
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
co
nt
ro
lle
r w
or
kl
oa
d 
in
 re
so
lv
in
g 
th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
w
ith
 m
ul
tip
le
 a
irc
ra
ft 
(e
.g
., 
re
tra
ns
m
itt
in
g 
th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
). 
• 
Sl
ig
ht
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 a
ir 
tra
ff
ic
 c
ap
ab
ili
ty
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A
TS
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A
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ft 
C
om
m
 6
 
A
n 
ai
rc
ra
ft 
ac
ts
 o
n 
m
es
sa
ge
s a
ff
ec
tin
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
(e
.g
., 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e)
 fr
om
 a
 
gr
ou
nd
 sy
st
em
 th
at
 
is
 n
ot
 it
s c
on
tro
l 
au
th
or
ity
. 
A
n 
un
au
th
or
iz
ed
 
gr
ou
nd
 sy
st
em
 se
nd
s 
a 
m
es
sa
ge
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n.
 
2D
 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 a
cc
ep
ts
 a
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 fr
om
 a
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 n
ot
 in
 c
on
tro
l o
f t
he
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
Th
e 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 a
ut
ho
rit
y 
is 
un
aw
ar
e 
of
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e,
 a
nd
 c
on
se
qu
en
tly
 th
e 
ai
rs
pa
ce
 
is
 n
ot
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
. 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n.
 
• 
Th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
re
su
lt 
in
 la
rg
e 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 sa
fe
ty
 m
ar
gi
ns
. 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
al
so
 re
su
lt 
in
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 h
av
in
g 
to
 m
ov
e 
se
ve
ra
l a
irc
ra
ft 
to
 re
es
ta
bl
is
h 
or
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
se
pa
ra
tio
n.
 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
ca
us
e 
tim
e-
cr
iti
ca
l a
irc
re
w
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ex
ce
ss
iv
e 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d.
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re
w
 a
cc
ep
ts
 a
 m
es
sa
ge
 th
at
 d
oe
s n
ot
 a
ff
ec
t s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
fr
om
 a
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 n
ot
 
in
 c
on
tro
l o
f t
he
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
Ti
m
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
sp
en
t r
es
po
nd
in
g 
to
 a
 m
es
sa
ge
 th
at
 th
at
 d
oe
s n
ot
 a
pp
ly
. 
• 
Th
is
 d
oe
s n
ot
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n.
 
 
A
TS
—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 8
 
A
 m
es
sa
ge
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
is
 a
ct
ed
 
on
 b
y 
an
 u
ni
nt
en
de
d 
re
ci
pi
en
t. 
1.
 A
dd
re
ss
 is
 
co
rr
up
te
d 
2.
 M
is
de
liv
er
ed
 
3.
 S
te
p-
on
 
2D
 
C
as
e 
1 
• 
A
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 a
nd
 re
ac
he
s a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 T
he
 a
irc
re
w
 d
oe
s n
ot
 
re
al
iz
e 
th
at
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
is
 n
ot
 fo
r t
he
m
 a
nd
 a
cc
ep
ts
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e.
 
(W
he
n 
th
e 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 re
ci
pi
en
t i
s n
ot
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
l a
ut
ho
ri
ty
, s
ee
 A
TS
-A
ir
cr
af
t 
C
O
M
M
-6
.) 
• 
U
po
n 
re
ce
ip
t o
f t
he
 W
IL
C
O
 to
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e,
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
r: 
 
(a
) d
oe
s n
ot
 re
al
iz
e 
th
at
 th
e 
W
IL
C
O
 is
 fr
om
 a
 d
iff
er
en
t a
irc
ra
ft 
th
an
 th
e 
in
te
nd
ed
 
on
e 
or
 9
b)
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
r r
ea
liz
es
 th
at
 th
e 
W
IL
C
O
 is
 fr
om
 a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
(T
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
ca
se
 a
 a
nd
 c
as
e 
b 
is
 ju
st
 h
ow
 so
on
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
r r
ea
liz
es
 
th
at
 th
er
e 
is
 a
 si
tu
at
io
n 
th
at
 n
ee
ds
 re
so
lu
tio
n.
) 
• 
In
 e
ith
er
 c
as
e,
 th
e 
ai
rs
pa
ce
 is
 n
ot
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
 a
nd
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
• 
Th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
re
su
lt 
in
 la
rg
e 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 sa
fe
ty
 m
ar
gi
ns
 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
al
so
 re
su
lt 
in
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 h
av
in
g 
to
 m
ov
e 
se
ve
ra
l a
irc
ra
ft 
to
 re
es
ta
bl
is
h 
or
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
se
pa
ra
tio
ns
 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
ca
us
e 
tim
e-
cr
iti
ca
l a
irc
re
w
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
C
as
e 
2 
• 
Th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 a
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 se
nt
 a
nd
 re
ac
he
s a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
. 
• 
Th
e 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 re
ce
iv
es
 a
 m
es
sa
ge
 th
at
 is
 u
ne
xp
ec
te
d;
 b
ut
 is
 n
o 
m
or
e 
th
an
 a
 n
ui
sa
nc
e.
 
• 
Th
e 
gr
ou
nd
 sy
st
em
 th
at
 sh
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
re
ce
iv
ed
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 m
es
sa
ge
; d
oe
s n
ot
 
re
ce
iv
e 
an
y 
m
es
sa
ge
; a
nd
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 e
xp
ire
s. 
 
 
NASA/CR—2011-216327 55
  
TA
B
LE
 1
3.
—
A
IR
C
R
A
FT
 H
A
ZA
R
D
S 
D
U
E 
TO
 T
H
E 
L-
B
A
N
D
 C
O
M
M
U
N
IC
A
TI
O
N
 S
Y
ST
EM
 
H
az
ar
d 
no
. 
H
az
ar
d 
de
sc
rip
tio
n 
C
au
se
s 
R
is
k 
an
al
ys
is
 
co
de
 
(R
A
C
) 
Po
ss
ib
le
 e
ff
ec
t 
C
om
m
en
ts
 
A
TS
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A
 m
es
sa
ge
 N
O
T 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
is
 a
ct
ed
 o
n 
by
 a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
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ci
pi
en
t. 
1.
 A
dd
re
ss
 is
 
co
rr
up
te
d 
2.
 M
is
de
liv
er
ed
 
3.
 S
te
p-
on
 
5D
 
C
as
e 
1 
• 
A
 m
es
sa
ge
 N
O
T 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
re
ac
he
s a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 T
he
 a
irc
re
w
 
do
es
 n
ot
 re
al
iz
e 
th
at
 th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 is
 n
ot
 fo
r t
he
m
 a
nd
 a
ct
s o
n 
it.
 
• 
If
 th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 re
qu
ire
s a
 re
sp
on
se
, u
po
n 
re
ce
ip
t o
f t
he
 re
sp
on
se
, t
he
 c
on
tro
lle
r: 
(a
) d
oe
s n
ot
 re
al
iz
e 
th
at
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 fr
om
 a
 d
iff
er
en
t a
irc
ra
ft 
th
an
 th
e 
in
te
nd
ed
 
on
e 
or
 (b
) t
he
 c
on
tro
lle
r r
ea
liz
es
 th
at
 th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 fr
om
 a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
If
 th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 d
oe
s n
ot
 re
qu
ire
 a
 re
sp
on
se
; t
he
 c
on
tro
lle
r m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
aw
ar
e 
th
at
 
m
es
sa
ge
 w
en
t t
o 
an
 u
ni
nt
en
de
d 
re
ci
pi
en
t, 
un
le
ss
 fl
ig
ht
 c
re
w
 e
xp
ec
tin
g 
a 
m
es
sa
ge
, 
qu
er
ie
s f
or
 m
is
si
ng
 m
es
sa
ge
. 
• 
Th
is
 d
oe
s n
ot
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n.
 
• 
A
t m
os
t t
hi
s c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 re
se
nd
in
g 
m
es
sa
ge
 to
 th
e 
in
te
nd
ed
 a
irc
ra
ft.
 In
 g
en
er
al
 th
is
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
w
el
l w
ith
in
 th
e 
no
rm
al
 
w
or
kl
oa
d.
  
• 
Th
er
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
a 
sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 a
irc
re
w
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
(o
f t
he
 u
ni
nt
en
de
d 
ai
rc
ra
ft)
 in
 
re
sp
on
di
ng
 to
 a
 m
es
sa
ge
 n
ot
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
 to
 th
em
. I
n 
ge
ne
ra
l t
hi
s w
ou
ld
 b
e 
w
el
l 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
no
rm
al
 w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
C
as
e 
2 
• 
A
 re
qu
es
t m
es
sa
ge
 re
ac
he
s a
n 
un
in
te
nd
ed
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
. 
• 
Th
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
r d
oe
s n
ot
 re
al
iz
e 
th
at
 re
qu
es
t i
s n
ot
 fo
r t
he
m
 a
nd
 re
sp
on
ds
 w
ith
 a
 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e.
 
• 
Th
is
 g
ro
un
d 
sy
st
em
 is
 n
ot
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
l a
ut
ho
rit
y 
of
 th
e 
ai
rc
ra
ft.
  
 
A
TS
—
A
irc
ra
ft 
C
om
m
 1
0 
A
 m
es
sa
ge
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
is
 
re
ce
iv
ed
 to
o 
la
te
 (o
r 
ex
pi
re
d)
.  
1.
 L
at
e 
de
liv
er
y 
2.
 G
ro
un
d 
an
d 
ai
r 
tim
e 
is
 o
ut
 o
f 
sy
nc
 
2D
 
• 
C
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 se
nt
 a
nd
 e
xp
ire
s b
ef
or
e 
a 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 re
ce
iv
ed
. 
O
R 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 a
cc
ep
ts
 a
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 a
fte
r i
t h
as
 e
xp
ire
d.
 
• 
Th
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
r r
ev
er
ts
 to
 a
lte
rn
at
e 
so
lu
tio
n 
du
e 
to
 th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
ex
pi
ry
; a
nd
 th
e 
ai
rs
pa
ce
 o
f t
he
 n
ew
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
. 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n.
 
• 
Th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
re
su
lt 
in
 la
rg
e 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 sa
fe
ty
 m
ar
gi
ns
. 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
al
so
 re
su
lt 
in
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 h
av
in
g 
to
 m
ov
e 
se
ve
ra
l a
irc
ra
ft.
 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
ca
us
e 
tim
e-
cr
iti
ca
l a
irc
re
w
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ex
ce
ss
iv
el
y 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
So
 fa
r n
o 
in
ci
de
nt
s 
du
e 
to
 th
is
 (R
ef
. 
10
). 
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tim
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is
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5D
 
C
as
e 
1 
• 
A
 m
es
sa
ge
 n
ot
 a
ff
ec
tin
g 
se
pa
ra
tio
n 
is
 tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 a
nd
 e
xp
ire
s b
ef
or
e 
a 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 
re
ce
iv
ed
. 
• 
Th
e 
co
nt
ro
lle
r r
ev
er
ts
 to
 a
lte
rn
at
e 
so
lu
tio
n 
du
e 
to
 th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
s’
 e
xp
iry
. 
• 
A
irc
re
w
 re
sp
on
ds
 to
 m
es
sa
ge
 a
fte
r i
t h
as
 e
xp
ire
d.
 
• 
Si
nc
e 
th
e 
ex
pi
re
d 
m
es
sa
ge
 d
oe
s n
ot
 a
ff
ec
t s
ep
ar
at
io
n,
 th
is
 d
oe
s n
ot
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f 
se
pa
ra
tio
n.
 
• 
A
t m
os
t t
hi
s c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 re
tra
ns
m
itt
in
g 
th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
. I
n 
ge
ne
ra
l t
hi
s w
ou
ld
 b
e 
w
el
l w
ith
in
 th
e 
no
rm
al
 w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
• 
Th
er
e 
m
ay
 b
e 
a 
sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 a
irc
re
w
 w
or
kl
oa
d.
 In
 g
en
er
al
 th
is
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
w
el
l 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
no
rm
al
 w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
C
as
e 
2 
• 
A
 re
qu
es
t m
es
sa
ge
 is
 tr
an
sm
itt
ed
 a
nd
 e
xp
ire
s b
ef
or
e 
a 
re
sp
on
se
 is
 re
ce
iv
ed
. 
• 
A
t m
os
t t
hi
s c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 sl
ig
ht
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 a
irc
re
w
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 
re
tra
ns
m
itt
in
g 
th
e 
re
qu
es
t m
es
sa
ge
. I
n 
ge
ne
ra
l t
hi
s w
ou
ld
 b
e 
w
el
l w
ith
in
 th
e 
no
rm
al
 
w
or
kl
oa
d.
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Th
e 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
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st
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pt
s a
 
m
es
sa
ge
. 
3D
 
C
as
e 
1 
• 
A
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 se
nt
 a
nd
 th
e 
co
nt
en
ts
 a
re
 c
or
ru
pt
ed
, b
ut
 st
ill
 c
re
di
bl
e.
 
• 
Th
e 
ai
rc
re
w
 a
cc
ep
ts
 th
e 
co
rr
up
te
d 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e.
 
• 
Si
nc
e 
th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
ha
s b
ee
n 
co
rr
up
te
d 
its
 a
irs
pa
ce
 is
 n
ot
 p
ro
te
ct
ed
. 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
(if
 th
e 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 c
or
ru
pt
ed
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 
co
nv
er
ge
s w
ith
 o
th
er
 a
irc
ra
ft 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
). 
• 
Th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
re
su
lt 
in
 la
rg
e 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 sa
fe
ty
 m
ar
gi
ns
 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
al
so
 re
su
lt 
in
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 h
av
in
g 
to
 m
ov
e 
se
ve
ra
l a
irc
ra
ft 
to
 re
es
ta
bl
is
h 
or
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
se
pa
ra
tio
ns
. 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
ca
us
e 
tim
e-
cr
iti
ca
l a
irc
re
w
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ex
ce
ss
iv
el
y 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
C
as
e 
2 
• 
Th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 is
 se
nt
 a
nd
 th
e 
co
nt
en
ts
 a
re
 c
or
ru
pt
ed
, b
ut
 st
ill
 c
re
di
bl
e.
 
(R
ea
db
ac
k 
is
 c
or
ru
pt
ed
 a
nd
 c
re
di
bl
e.
) 
• 
O
nc
e 
th
e 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
re
sp
on
se
 h
as
 b
ee
n 
re
ce
iv
ed
; e
ith
er
 th
e 
ol
d 
cl
ea
ra
nc
e 
ai
rs
pa
ce
 o
r 
th
e 
ne
w
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 a
irs
pa
ce
 b
ec
om
es
 u
np
ro
te
ct
ed
; b
ut
 it
 is
 p
re
ci
se
ly
 th
e 
op
po
si
te
 o
f 
w
ha
t t
he
 a
irc
ra
ft 
is
 d
oi
ng
. 
• 
Th
is
 c
ou
ld
 re
su
lt 
in
 a
 lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
(if
 th
e 
ac
ce
pt
ed
 c
or
ru
pt
ed
 c
le
ar
an
ce
 
co
nv
er
ge
s w
ith
 o
th
er
 a
irc
ra
ft 
cl
ea
ra
nc
es
). 
• 
Th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
re
su
lt 
in
 la
rg
e 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 sa
fe
ty
 m
ar
gi
ns
 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
si
tu
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
al
so
 re
su
lt 
in
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
A
TC
 w
or
kl
oa
d 
du
e 
to
 h
av
in
g 
to
 m
ov
e 
se
ve
ra
l a
irc
ra
ft 
to
 re
es
ta
bl
is
h 
or
 m
ai
nt
ai
n 
se
pa
ra
tio
ns
. 
• 
R
es
ol
vi
ng
 th
e 
lo
ss
 o
f s
ep
ar
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
ca
us
e 
tim
e 
cr
iti
ca
l a
irc
re
w
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ex
ce
ss
iv
el
y 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
w
or
kl
oa
d.
 
C
as
e 
3 
• 
Th
e 
ad
dr
es
s o
r a
ll 
si
gn
 is
 th
e 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
m
es
sa
ge
 th
at
 b
ec
om
es
 c
or
ru
pt
ed
.  
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C
as
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• 
A
 m
es
sa
ge
 n
ot
 a
ff
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se
pa
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n 
is
 tr
an
sm
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ed
 a
nd
 th
e 
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C.2.2 Aircraft-to-Aircraft Message 
This section presents the 15 identified NAS communication hazards as they apply to ATS-only 
messages exchanged between aircraft. Table 14 contains the hazard analysis worksheet for the following 
function: 
 
L.1.1.3.1.1 Transceive Airborne Aircraft to Airborne Aircraft Message 
 
The system state leading to WCE is the same for all aircraft-to-aircraft hazards due to the L-band 
communication system: 
 
• Peak traffic conditions 
• IMCs (see-and-avoid may not be possible) 
• Adverse weather conditions 
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Appendix D.—Summary of the Operational Safety Assessment for the ATS 
Services Identified for L-band Application 
Communications Operating Concepts and Requirements (COCR) Version 2.0 documents operational 
and safety requirements for ATS data communications services and information security requirements for 
air traffic services (ATS) and autonomous operations services (AOS). A service-level operational safety 
assessment (OSA) is performed to derive safety requirements (Ref. 2). 
The following subsections summarize the assessment for the services applicable to the proposed 
L-band communications system as proposed by the Future Communication Infrastructure (FCI) 
Aeronautical Data Services Definition Task Report (Ref. 5). 
D.1 Safety Objectives Definitions 
Table 14 outlines the hazard effects and the classification scheme used to describe the severity of the 
ATS service hazards.  
Based on the fact that each class hazard can be tolerated to a different degree, COCR derives safety 
objectives quantifying the degree of tolerance for each hazard class as shown in Table 15. 
 
 
TABLE 15.—SAFETY OBJECTIVE DEFINITIONS (REF. 2) 
Hazard class Safety objective Definition, 
per flight hour 
5, no safety 
effect 
Frequent ≥1 occurrence in 10–3  
4, minor Probable ≤1 occurrence in 10–3  
3, major Remote ≤1 occurrence in 10–5  
2, hazardous Extremely remote ≤1 occurrence in 10–7  
1, catastrophic Extremely improbable ≤1 occurrence in 10–9  
 
D.2 Summary of the L-band ATS Services Operational Safety Assessment 
The COCR (Ref. 2) provides a useful operational safety assessment summary applicable to the 
L-band ATS services case: 
At the highest level the ATS services operational safety hazards are 1) loss of service, 
and 2) hazardously misleading information. Loss of service is defined the lack of 
availability of a service when it is required. Hazardously misleading information consists 
of undetected corrupted messages, undetected misdelivered messages, undetected late or 
missing messages and undetected out-of-sequence messages. The safety analyses were 
based on the operational use of the services as described in Sections 2 and 3 [of the 
COCR], in conjunction with the operational environment characteristics and conditions 
described in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.4.1 [of the COCR]. 
Note that only services identified as potential applications for the proposed L-band system (Ref. 5) are 
included in this document, thus presenting only a subset of the corresponding section and tables of the 
COCR. 
  
 NASA/CR—2011-216327 66  
Table 16 presents the OSA hazard severity and corresponding safety objectives for service categories 
for the two high-level safety hazards. As discussed earlier, introduction of an L-band system is assumed 
to correspond to Phase II future radio system (FRS) evolution.  
 
 
TABLE 16.—AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES OPERATIONAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
HAZARD SEVERITY AND SAFETY OBJECTIVES 
Service category Loss of service Hazardously misleading 
information 
Severity Safety objective Severity Safety objective 
Flight information services (FIS) 4 Probable 2 Extremely remote 
Advisory services (AVS) 3 Remote 2 Extremely remote 
Emergency information services (EIS) 4 Probable 3 Remote 
Flight position/intent/preferences service (FPS) 3 Remote 2 Extremely remote  
Miscellaneous services (MCS) 1 Extremely improbable 1 Extremely improbable 
 
Figure 35 and Figure 36 present safety risk matrices for loss of service and hazardously misleading 
information hazards, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 35.—Safety risk matrix—loss of service. 
 
 
 
Severity
No Safety 
Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Likelihood 5 4 3 2 1
Frequent A
Probable B
2
Remote C
2
Extremely 
Remote D
Extremely 
Improbable E 1
*
* Unacceptable with Single Point
and Common Cause Failure
High Risk
Medium Risk
Low Risk
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Figure 36.—Safety risk matrix—hazardously misleading information. 
D.3 Service-Level Safety Assessment (L-band Services Only) 
As described in the COCR (Ref. 2), Table 17 provides safety assessment for each ATS service. The 
column headers are defined as follows: 
 
• Service.—The acronym for the ATS service. 
• Integrity.—The safety effect when an undetected error occurs. 
• Continuity.—The safety effect when communications fails once started. 
• Availability of Provision.—The safety effect when unable to communicate to all aircraft. 
• Availability of Use.—The safety effect when unable to communicate with one aircraft.  
 
TABLE 17.—SERVICE LEVEL SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
Servicea Continuity Integrity Availability (provision) Availability (use) 
D-ORIS Minor Hazardous Major Minor 
D-OTIS Minor Hazardous Major Minor 
D-SIG Minor Hazardous Minor Minor 
D-RVR Minor Hazardous Major Minor 
WAKE Major Hazardous Minor Minor 
FLIPCY Major Hazardous Hazardous Major 
SAP Minor Major Major Minor 
PPD No safety effect Minor No safety effect No safety effect 
D–SIGMET Minor Hazardous Minor Minor 
DYNAV No safety effect Minor No safety effect No safety effect 
URCO Major Major Minor Minor 
AIRSEP Major Hazardous Hazardous Major 
 
 It should be noted that the COCR Version 2.0 document safety assessment focused on safety 
objectives and possible consequences of safety lapses and did not identify causes of potential safety 
hazards and/or performance degradation.
Severity
No Safety 
Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Likelihood 5 4 3 2 1
Frequent A
Probable B
Remote C
1
Extremely 
Remote D
3
Extremely 
Improbable E 1
*
* Unacceptable with Single Point
and Common Cause Failure
High Risk
Medium Risk
Low Risk
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Appendix E.—Existing National Airspace System Communications System 
Safety Controls 
Existing National Airspace System (NAS) communications system safety controls provided in the 
NAS Communications System Safety Hazard Analysis and Security Threat Analysis (Ref. 10)  document 
were reviewed. Most, but not all, of the controls were found applicable to the proposed L-band system. 
Additional controls were considered. 
Table 18 includes the required controls (i.e., identifies procedures, environment, requirements, etc.) 
that reduce the probability of occurrence of the hazard, limit the severity, and/or reduce the likelihood of 
occurrence of the worst credible effect (WCE) and shall be implemented by program to meet the 
identified risk or risk analysis code (RAC) for each hazard. 
 
 
TABLE 18.—COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY CONTROLS 
Existing  
control ref. no.a  
Existing NAS controls Proposed controls 
1 The air-ground terminal communications (TCOM) and en route 
communications (ECOM) communication shall be in accordance with 
Communication Diversity Order 6000.36A. 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
2 The NAS shall provide air-ground communications capabilities on a 
continuous basis (NAS–SR-1000 3.6.1.E). 
The NAS shall provide air-ground 
communications continuously (NAS 
SR–1000, part of 20330). Control 
applies to air/air and air/ground 
communications. 
3 The air-ground communication system shall comply with Critical services 
performance requirements: Availability - 0.99999; No single point of 
failure of equipment, system, installation or facility shall cause loss of 
service to the user/specialist; The goal for a single loss of critical service to 
a user/specialist shall not exceed the duration of 6 seconds; The frequency 
of occurrence goal for any loss of service shall not exceed one per week. 
NAS SR-1000 Section 3.8.1 Operational Readiness, Table 3.6.1). 
The following controls apply to 
air/air and air/ground 
communications: 
The NAS shall provide service 
availability not less than that 
provided by existing capabilities. 
Critical Services -0.99999 Essential 
Services -0.999 Routine Services  
-0.99 (NAS SR 1000, 21470). 
The NAS shall strive to restore 
critical system service to 
users/specialists within 6 seconds of 
failure (NAS SR–1000, 22900). 
The NAS shall strive to restore 
routine system service to 
users/specialists within 1.68 hours 
of failure (22920). 
The NAS shall strive to restore 
essential system service to 
users/specialists within 10 minutes 
of failure (NAS SR–1000, 22910). 
No single point of failure of 
equipment, system, installation or 
facility shall cause loss of service to 
the user/specialist. 
4 The NAS shall provide specialists with the capability to communicate 
with aircraft and vehicles in the airport movement area. Alternative forms 
of communication, such as visual signals transmitted by specialists, shall 
be provided in case normal air-ground voice and data communications 
fail or are unavailable (NAS-SR-1000 3.2.11.F). 
Existing control applies. Reference 
not found in the new version of the 
NAS SR–1000. 
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TABLE 18.—COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY CONTROLS 
Existing  
control ref. no.a  
Existing NAS controls Proposed controls 
5 The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for and is the 
final authority as to the operation of that aircraft. (FAA Order 7110.65 
91.3(a)) 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
6 Standard no com procedures: Lost Communications procedures are 
prescribed. (Aeronautical Information Manual [AIM] 4-2-13) and 
Standard pilot procedures two-way radio communication failure Federal 
Aviation Regulations [FAR] 91.113 
• Alternate control procedure (i.e., light gun instructions from towers) 
• “See and Avoid” procedures are prescribed. (Aeronautical Information 
Manual [AIM] 5-5-8 and Federal Aviation Regulations [FAR] 91.113 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
7 Current separation standards. ( FAA order 7110.65) Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
8 Procedures for maintaining clearance limits [definitions of clearance limit 
are FAA Pilot/Controller Glossary also the ICAO definition, ATC 
Clearance limit procedures are prescribed (7110.65, 4-6-1a Clearance 
Limit and FAR 91.185)] 
• ICAO PANS-RAC 4444: paragraph 5.2.1.1 “No clearance shall be 
given to execute any maneuver that would reduce the spacing between 
two aircraft to less than the separation minimum.” 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
9 Aircraft under radar and/or visual surveillance (except ocean and some 
ground environments in IMC). (FAA Order 7110.65P Effective Data 
August 4, 2005 Chapter 5 Radar and Visual p 7-2-1.) 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
10 Aircraft-to-aircraft communications remains available (airborne or on-
ground) 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
11 ATC procedures to transfer communication functions (after 
communication failure) to other positions/sectors/facilities are prescribed. 
(7110.65, 10-4-4) 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
12 Possible alternative communications capabilities (e.g., cell phone, public 
telephone, AOC, satellite phone when available relay (neighboring 
facility). Local SOP tailored to that facility and good operating 
procedures or FAA Order 7110.65P Effective Data August 4, 2005 
Chapter 10 Emergencies section 1 General 10-1-1d. 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
13 TCAS is available for Transport Category Aircraft. (FAR 14CFR Part 
129.18) 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
14 Procedures requiring “pilot acknowledgement/read back” when ATC 
issues clearances or instructions (7110.65, 2-4-3). 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
15 Controllers can also determine aircraft action through surveillance; 
IDENT, observing radar screen (FAA Order 7110.65P Effective Data 
August 4, 2005 Chapter 5 Radar). 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air and air/ground 
communication system hazards. 
16 Controllers are required to order a clearance such that the critical 
information cannot be lost due to a failure truncating a message. 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
17 Air-to-air communications still available, so another aircrew may hear a 
step on or incorrect readback and notify, and/or aircraft can announce 
intentions on party line. 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air communication 
system hazards. 
 NASA/CR—2011-216327 71  
TABLE 18.—COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SAFETY CONTROLS 
Existing  
control ref. no.a  
Existing NAS controls Proposed controls 
18 Procedures requiring aircraft identification for clearance (7110.65, 2-4-
20) 
• Call sign/runway ID (not shortened call sign) 
• Procedures for identification of the aircraft requesting clearances 
• Procedures for giving aircraft ID in granting clearances 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
19 Procedures requiring Facility Identification (7110.65, 2-4-8) for the ATC 
facility giving the clearances. 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
20 ICAO Annex 11: paragraph 3.5.1 “A controlled flight shall be under the 
control of only one air traffic control unit at any given time.” 
• The aircraft shall accept clearances/instructions only from the current 
control authority. 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
21 The intended recipient is also listening so he/she may query or chime in 
(party line). 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
22 Voice procedures: 
• Procedures for giving aircraft ID in granting clearances 
• Procedures for communication when aircraft have same or similar call 
signs 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
23 Voice and data communications shall have the following response 
capabilities: 
• Initiation of one-way air-ground voice transmissions shall be possible 
within 250 milliseconds of keying the specialist’s microphone. 
• The ground-air transmission time for data messages shall not exceed 6 
seconds (NAS-SR-1000 3.6.1.A.5). 
The NAS shall assure ground-air 
transmission time for data messages 
not exceed 6 seconds (NAS SR-
1000, 20090). 
24 Time-critical clearance can be sent with constraint (e.g., to reach by, 
cross at or before etc.). Thus if message was too late then aircrew would 
have send an UNABLE response. FAA Order 7110.65P (Chapter 4, 
Section 3 Departure Procedures 4-3-4 a. Clearance Void Times). 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
25 ADS report (surveillance) can provide aircraft position (FAA Order 
7110.65P Effective Data August 4, 2005 Chapter 5 Radar). 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
26 CPDLC pilot position reports can provide aircraft position. Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
27 Oceanic separation standards (FAA Order 7110.65P Effective Data 
August 4, 2005 Chapter 8 Offshore/Oceanic Procedures). 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
28 Clearly intelligible air-ground voice communications shall be provided 
(NAS-SR-1000 3.6.1.A). 
The NAS shall provide intelligible 
air-ground voice communications 
(NAS SR-1000, 20040). 
29 Procedures requiring Emphasis for Clarity (7110.65, 2-4-15). Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air communication 
system hazards. 
30 Only one Pre-Departure Clearance (PDC) is sent (thus cannot get out of 
order). 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards. 
31 Airport design minimizes runway and taxiway crossing by vehicles. N/A 
32 Standard no com procedures. Covered by Control 6 
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Existing  
control ref. no.a  
Existing NAS controls Proposed controls 
33 Vehicle operation training/licensing for airport operations Part 139.329(e) 
requires that “each certificate holder shall—ensure that each employee, 
tenant, or contractor who operates aground vehicle on any portion of the 
airport that has access to the movement area is familiar with the airport's 
procedures for the operation of ground vehicles and the consequences of 
noncompliance.” To comply with Part 139.329(e), airport operators 
should have a ground vehicle guidebook for training personnel authorized 
to operate a ground vehicle on the airport. Part 139.301 Records—ground 
vehicle training; 139.303 Personnel Sufficient Qualified Personnel 
(303a), Properly Equipped (303b), Trained (303c), Record of Training for 
24 CCM (303d) 
N/A 
34 Vehicles all yield to aircraft: AC 150/5210-20 Ground Vehicle 
Operations on Airports—guidance to airport operators in developing 
training programs for safe ground vehicle operations, Sample Ground 
Vehicle Operations Training Manual Appendix C 1.7.10. No vehicle 
operator shall enter the movement area— 
a. Without first obtaining permission of the (AIRPORT OPERATOR) 
and clearance from the ATCT to enter the movement area; 
b. Unless equipped with an operable two-way radio in communication 
with the ATCT; or 
c. Unless escorted by an (AIRPORT OPERATOR) vehicle and as long 
as the vehicle remains under the control of the escort vehicle. 
N/A 
35 Vehicles under visual surveillance or radar/multi-lateration surveillance: 
FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control Handbook, paragraph 3-1-3, 
“Use of Active Runways,” states, “The local controller has primary 
responsibility for operations conducted on the active runway and must 
control the use of those runways.” Paragraph 3-1-12, “Visually Scanning 
Runways,” states that, “Local controllers shall visually scan runways to 
the maximum extent possible.” 
N/A 
36 Mobile-to mobile communications still available N/A 
37 The NAS shall provide specialists with the capability to communicate 
with aircraft and vehicles in the airport movement area. Alternative forms 
of communication, such as visual signals transmitted by specialists, shall 
be provided in case normal air-ground voice and data communications 
fail or are unavailable. (NAS-SR-1000 3.2.11.F) 
Covered by Control #4 
38 Possible alternative communications capabilities e.g., cell phone, ATCT 
light gun procedures 
Covered by Control #12 
39 Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 139 (14 CFR Part 139] 
requirement to familiarize vehicles for operating on a given airport. 
N/A 
40 FAA Order 7110.65, Air Traffic Control Handbook, paragraph 3-1-3, Use 
of Active Runways, - The local controller has primary responsibility for 
operations conducted on the active runway and must control the use of 
those runways. 
N/A 
41 AC 150/5340-18D Standards for Airport Sign Systems Part 139.311 CFR 
MARKING, SIGNS AND LIGHTING AC 150/5210-22 Airport 
Certification Manual (ACM): Paragraph 302(a) “Airport sign and 
marking plans must receive FAA approval before they are implemented” 
Chapter 5. Section 139.311 “Include in the ACM a legible color diagram 
of the airport sign and marking systems.” 
N/A 
42 FAA Order 7110.65 Paragraph 3-1-12, Visually Scanning Runways - 
Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent 
possible. 
N/A 
43 CFR Part 139.329(b) airport operators are required to establish and 
implement procedures for operation of ground vehicles in the safety area 
as well as the movement area. 
N/A 
44 CFR Part 139.205(b)(19) requires that these procedures be included in the 
Airport Certification Manual (ACM). 
N/A 
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Existing  
control ref. no.a  
Existing NAS controls Proposed controls 
45 Controller use of full call sign/runway ID (not shortened) (FAA Order 
7110.65P 3-7-1 Ground Traffic Movement Phraseology) 
N/A 
46 Controllers must establish position before moving vehicle (FAA Order 
7110.65 Section 1 General 3-1-7 Position Determination) 
N/A 
47 Procedures for identification of vehicles requesting clearances (Part 
139CFR ground vehicle guidebook for training) 
N/A 
48 Controller procedures for giving vehicle ID in granting clearances (FAA 
Order 7110.65 Section 7 Taxi and Ground Movement Procedures 3-7-2 
Taxi and Ground Movement Operations) 
N/A 
49 Vehicle readback procedures (voice) (Part 139CFR ground vehicle 
guidebook for training) 
N/A 
50 Intrafacility communication requirements have been minimized due to 
automation of many functions 
N/A 
51 Controller/ assistant/ supervisor can walk over and talk to other 
controller. 
N/A 
52 Voice messages would not get a proper acknowledgement, when 
truncated due to a failure (Procedure between interphone 
intra/interfacility communication which utilize numeric position 
identification, the caller must identify both position and facility (FAA 
Order 7110.65P 2-4-12 Interphone Message Format) e. The receiver 
states the response to the caller's message followed by the receiver's 
operating initials. f. The caller states his or her operating initials). 
N/A 
53 SR-1000: 3.6.2A 1: The NAS shall provide direct-access voice 
communications connectivity between specialist in on ATC facility and 
designated specialist in another facility. The number of direct-access calls 
that are blocked because of saturation of equipment shall not exceed 1 in 
1000 calls. 
N/A 
54 Other facility can be reached by other means (Local Contingency Plan - 
FAA Order 7210.3 Facility 2-1-7 Air Traffic Service (ATS)) Continuity 
a. Facilities shall develop and maintain current operational plans and 
procedures to provide continuity of required services during emergency 
conditions (e.g. power failures, fire, flood ) b. Contingency plans). · 
Relay through aircraft · Cell phones · Public phone system (FAA Order 
7210.3 Section 3, 3-3-1. SERVICE “F” COMMUNICATIONS Facility 
AT managers shall establish procedures to provide interim 
communications in the event that local or long-line standard Service “F” 
fail. These shall include the use of telephone conference circuits and the 
use of airline or other facilities; 3-3-2. TELEPHONE 
COMMUNICATIONS) 
N/A 
55 Facilities periodically check availability of communications with other 
facilities and would be aware of loss of communications. 
N/A 
56 Procedures exist to transfer control to another facility in case of failure. 
(e.g., primarily redundancy: ARTCC to ARTCC and ARTCC to 
Command Center rely through third party) FAA Order 7210.3 Facility 
Operation and Administration; Section 3. Letters of Agreement (LOA) 4-
3-1. LETTERS OF AGREEMENT; 4-3-2. APPROPRIATE SUBJECTS 
Examples of subjects of LOAs are: a. Between ARTCCs: 1. Radar 
handoff procedures.2. Interfacility coordination procedures.3. Delegation 
of responsibility for IFR control jurisdiction 
N/A 
57 Procedures exist to have aircraft initiate transfer with receiving facility. 
(FAA Order 7110.65P 8-2-2 Transfer of Control and Communications). 
N/A 
58 Automation and visual alerts to detect: 
 • Aircraft positions 
 • Out-of-conformance 
 • Potential conflicts 
N/A 
59 7110: IFR operations in any class of controlled airspace, a pilot must 
receive an appropriate ATC clearance prior to entering in the airspace. 
N/A 
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control ref. no.a  
Existing NAS controls Proposed controls 
60 Inter-facility data communications shall be provided with error detection 
and correction capabilities (NASSRS 3.6.3.A.11) NAS systems digital 
circuits basic requirement to provide in excess of 99.9% error free 
seconds. 
N/A 
61 NAS-SR-1000 p3.6.2.A.3 Ground-Ground Interfacility Communications 
Connectivity 5) Clearly intelligible interfacility voice communications 
shall be provided. 
N/A 
62 FTI Attachment J.1, FAA Telecommunications Services Description 
(FTSD): Voice Quality Mean Opinion Score (MOS) equal to or greater 
than 4.3. 
N/A 
63 ATC uses judgment whether or not to clear aircraft to land. (FAA Order 
7110.65P 3-1-5. VEHICLES/EQUIPMENT/ PERSONNEL ON 
RUNWAYS) 
N/A 
64 The NAS shall provide the specialist with an unobstructed view of the 
airport movement area. (NAS-SR-1000 3.2.11.D). 
N/A 
65 The NAS shall be capable of continuously broadcasting the latest 
approved aerodrome and terminal area conditions on communications 
media which can be accessed by aircraft in flight and on the ground. 
(NAS-SR-1000 3.3.3.B). 
N/A 
66 Aeronautical information shall be continuously (24 hours a day) 
accessible to specialists. (NAS-SR-1000 3.1.2.B). 
N/A 
67 Aeronautical information shall be continuously (24 hours a day) 
accessible to users upon request with or without the aid of specialists. 
(NAS-SR-1000 3.1.2.C).. 
N/A 
68 Aeronautical information shall be obtainable along a specified route, or in 
conjunction with specified locations or areas, or by reporting location. 
(NAS-SR-1000 3.1.2.D). 
N/A 
69 Real-time required communication between FIRs has been minimized; 
most transfers can be done sufficiently in advance. (FAA Order 7110.65P 
Section 8-2-1 Coordination) 
N/A 
70 Foreign ATC can be reached by other means:  
• Relay through aircraft 
• Cell phones 
• Public phone system 
N/A 
71 In a two-way exchange; usually getting cut-off etc. would be detected by 
one or both parties and coordination would be attempted again; it would 
be rare for the failure to go undetected. 
N/A 
72 Boundary Coordination Times are agreed by Memorandum of 
Understanding between FIRs. (FAA Order 7110.65P 8-2-2) 
N/A 
73 Receiving ground system has flight plan.  
(FAA Order 7110.65P 8-2-1 a) 
N/A 
74 Receiving ground system would initiate coordination/transfer.  
(FAA Order 7110.65P 8-2-2) 
N/A 
75 ICAO format boundary coordination messages are tagged and time 
stamped. 
N/A 
76 AOC-ATC messages cannot affect separation. N/A 
77 Aircraft have highly reliable systems. (AC-25-11 viii, Loss of all 
communication functions must be improbable; RTCA/DO-254 Design 
Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware; AC 25.1309-1A 
(Air Transport ) SYSTEM DESIGN AND ANALYSIS; AC 23.1309-1C 
(General Aviation) EQUIPMENT, SYSTEMS, AND INSTALLATIONS 
IN PART 23 AIRPLANES;FAA FAR 121 requirement of “two means of 
communication for the intended operating environment”) 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air communication 
system hazards 
78 Standard operating procedures/pilot training Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/air communication 
system hazards 
79 Redundancy to prevent interruption - centers can talk to multiple facilities 
(2 or 3 facilities typical) and command center 
N/A 
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Existing  
control ref. no.a  
Existing NAS controls Proposed controls 
80 Diverse entry points into facilities. (Communication Diversity Order 
6000.36 A). 
N/A 
81 Procedure to switch to emergency operational AT procedures. (FAA 
Order 7210.3 Facility Operation and Administration Section 3 Letters of 
Agreement (LOA) 4-3-1 Letters of Agreement; g. Establish 
responsibilities for: 2. Providing emergency services). 
N/A 
82 Procedure to switch to FAA-owned communications systems – 
FAATSAT transportable equip., RCL, portable air-ground radio. 
N/A 
83 IDAT parity and checksum to reliably detect corruption of the message. N/A 
84 ATC able to transmit command clearances and receive pilot feedback via 
equipment other than com radio (e.g. transponder, navigation radio) 
(FAA Order 7110.65, 10-4-4, 3-2-1, FARs 91.215, 91.205) 
Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards 
85 Data Link Messages are time stamped so order can be determined Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards 
86 Data link response message indicate to which message they refer Existing control applies to the 
proposed air/ground communication 
system hazards 
89  The NAS shall comply with 
national standards to avoid the 
interference of new systems with 
existing systems. (NAS SR-1000, 
19310) 
90  L-DACS shall comply with the 
performance and infrastructure 
requirements. 
aControl numbers 1to 83 correspond to the existing controls, Table 2-3 p. 14  of Ref. 10. Controls 84 to 86 are noted in the above 
document but not listed in Table 2-3. Controls beyond 86 are additional controls suggested for the proposed L-DACS. 
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Appendix F.—SP 800–53 Security Controls Applicable to L–DACS 
The SP 800–53 security controls catalog contains 17 families of controls71 that belong to three control 
classes: management, operational, and technical.  
Table 19 summarizes the classes and families in the security control catalog and the associated family 
identifiers. Each family contains security controls related to the security functionality of the family. A 
two-character identifier is assigned to uniquely identify each control family. Families of controls found 
relevant to the proposed L–DACS are highlighted in yellow. 
 
TABLE 19.—SECURITY CONTROL CLASSES,  
FAMILIES, AND IDENTIFIERS 
Identifier Control family Control class 
AC  Access Control  Technical  
AT  Awareness and Training  Operational  
AU  Audit and Accountability  Technical  
CA  Certification, Accreditation, and Security 
Assessments  
Management  
CM  Configuration Management  Operational  
CP  Contingency Planning  Operational  
IA  Identification and Authentication  Technical  
IR  Incident Response  Operational  
MA  Maintenance  Operational  
MP  Media Protection  Operational  
PE  Physical and Environmental Protection  Operational  
PL  Planning  Management  
PS  Personnel Security  Operational  
RA  Risk Assessment  Management  
SA  System and Services Acquisition  Management  
SC  System and Communications Protection  Technical  
SI  System and Information Integrity  Operational  
 
Evaluation of the controls resulted in identification of 46 of the 171 individual controls relevant to 
this assessment. They are listed in Table 20. 
 
TABLE 20.—SECURITY CONTROLS RELEVANT TO THE PROPOSED L–DACSa 
Control families Control Control ID 
Access control (AC) The information system enforces assigned authorizations for controlling 
access to the system in accordance with applicable policy. 
AC–3 
The information system enforces assigned authorizations for controlling the 
flow of information within the system and between interconnected systems in 
accordance with applicable policy. 
AC–4 
The information system enforces separation of duties through assigned access 
authorizations. 
AC–5 
The information system enforces the most restrictive set of rights/privileges 
or accesses needed by users (or processes acting on behalf of users) for the 
performance of specified tasks. 
AC–6 
                                                     
71As noted in NAS SR–1000, the seventeen security control families in NIST Special Publication 800–53 are closely 
aligned with the 17 security-related areas in FIPS 200 specifying the minimum security requirements for protecting federal 
information and information systems. Families are assigned to their respective classes based on the dominant characteristics of 
the controls in that family. Many security controls, however, can be logically associated with more than one class.  
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TABLE 20.—SECURITY CONTROLS RELEVANT TO THE PROPOSED L–DACSa 
Control families Control Control ID 
The information system enforces a limit of [Assignment: organization-defined 
number] consecutive invalid access attempts by a user during a [Assignment: 
organization-defined time period] time period. The information system 
automatically [Selection: locks the account/node for an [Assignment: 
organization-defined time period], delays next login prompt according to 
[Assignment: organization-defined delay algorithm.]] when the maximum 
number of unsuccessful attempts is exceeded. 
AC–7 
The information system displays an approved, system use notification 
message before granting system access informing potential users: (i) that the 
user is accessing a U.S. Government information system; (ii) that system 
usage may be monitored, recorded, and subject to audit; (iii) that 
unauthorized use of the system is prohibited and subject to criminal and civil 
penalties; and (iv) that use of the system indicates consent to monitoring and 
recording. The system use notification message provides appropriate privacy 
and security notices (based on associated privacy and security policies or 
summaries) and remains on the screen until the user takes explicit actions to 
log on to the information system. 
AC–8 
The information system notifies the user, upon successful logon, of the date 
and time of the last logon, and the number of unsuccessful logon attempts 
since the last successful logon. 
AC–9 
The information system limits the number of concurrent sessions for any user 
to [Assignment: organization-defined number of sessions]. 
AC–10 
The information system prevents further access to the system by initiating a 
session lock after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of 
inactivity, and the session lock remains in effect until the user reestablishes 
access using appropriate identification and authentication procedures 
AC–11 
The information system automatically terminates a remote session after 
[Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity. 
AC–12 
The information system marks output using standard naming conventions to 
identify any special dissemination, handling, or distribution instructions. 
AC–15 
The information system appropriately labels information in storage, in 
process, and in transmission. 
AC–16 
Audit and accountability 
(AU) 
The information system generates audit records for the following events: 
[Assignment: organization-defined auditable events]. 
AU–2 
The information system produces audit records that contain sufficient 
information to establish what events occurred, the sources of the events, and 
the outcomes of the events 
AU–3 
The information system alerts appropriate organizational officials in the event 
of an audit processing failure and takes the following additional actions: 
[Assignment: organization-defined actions to be taken (e.g., shut down 
information system, overwrite oldest audit records, stop generating audit 
records)]. 
AU–5 
The information system provides an audit reduction and report generation 
capability. 
AU–7 
The information system provides time stamps for use in audit record 
generation. 
AU–8 
The information system protects audit information and audit tools from 
unauthorized access, modification, and deletion 
AU–9 
The information system provides the capability to determine whether a given 
individual took a particular action. 
AU–10 
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Control families Control Control ID 
Identification and 
authentication (IA) 
The information system uniquely identifies and authenticates users (or 
processes acting on behalf of users). 
IA–2 
The information system identifies and authenticates specific devices before 
establishing a connection. 
IA–3 
The information system obscures feedback of authentication information 
during the authentication process to protect the information from possible 
exploitation/use by unauthorized individuals 
IA–6 
The information system employs authentication methods that meet the 
requirements of applicable laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, 
regulations, standards, and guidance for authentication to a cryptographic 
module. 
IA–7 
Systems communications 
protection (SC) 
The information system separates user functionality (including user interface 
services) from information system management functionality. 
SC–2 
The information system isolates security functions from nonsecurity 
functions. 
SC–3 
The information system prevents unauthorized and unintended information 
transfer via shared system resources 
SC–4 
The information system protects against or limits the effects of the following 
types of denial of service attacks: [Assignment: organization-defined list of 
types of denial of service attacks or reference to source for current list]. 
SC–5 
The information system limits the use of resources by priority. SC–6 
The information system monitors and controls communications at the external 
boundary of the information system and at key internal boundaries within the 
system. 
SC–7 
The information system protects the integrity of transmitted information. SC–8 
The information system protects the confidentiality of transmitted 
information 
SC–9 
The information system terminates a network connection at the end of a 
session or after [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of inactivity. 
SC–10 
The information system establishes a trusted communications path between 
the user and the following security functions of the system: [Assignment: 
organization-defined security functions to include at a minimum, information 
system authentication and reauthentication]. 
SC–11 
For information requiring cryptographic protection, the information system 
implements cryptographic mechanisms that comply with applicable laws, 
Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. 
SC–13 
The information system protects the integrity and availability of publicly 
available information and applications. 
SC–14 
The information system prohibits remote activation of collaborative 
computing mechanisms and provides an explicit indication of use to the local 
users. 
SC–15 
The information system reliably associates security parameters with 
information exchanged between information systems 
SC–16 
The information system that provides name/address resolution service 
provides additional data origin and integrity artifacts along with the 
authoritative data it returns in response to resolution queries. 
SC–20 
The information system that provides name/address resolution service for 
local clients performs data origin authentication and data integrity verification 
on the resolution responses it receives from authoritative sources when 
requested by client systems. 
SC–21 
The information systems that collectively provide name/address resolution 
service for an organization are fault tolerant and implement role separation. 
SC–22 
The information system provides mechanisms to protect the authenticity of 
communications sessions. 
SC–23 
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Control families Control Control ID 
System information  
integrity (SI) 
The information system verifies the correct operation of security functions 
[Selection (one or more): upon system startup and restart, upon command by 
user with appropriate privilege, periodically every [Assignment: 
organization-defined time-period]] and [Selection (one or more): notifies 
system administrator, shuts the system down, restarts the system] when 
anomalies are discovered. 
SI–6 
The information system detects and protects against unauthorized changes to 
software and information. 
SI–7 
The information system implements spam protection SI–8 
The information system checks information for accuracy, completeness, 
validity, and authenticity. 
SI–10 
The information system identifies and handles error conditions in an 
expeditious manner without providing information that could be exploited by 
adversaries. 
SI–11 
aOnly the controls that impose limitations/requirements on the information system are listed here. Additional controls may apply 
noting organizational responsibilities. Refer to Ref. 20 for complete list of controls. 
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